# \[REPORT\] bsdETH Quarterly Report Q1 2026

**URL:** <https://forum.reserve.org/t/report-bsdeth-quarterly-report-q1-2026/1516>\
**Category:** Based ETH (bsdETH)\
**Created:** [April 15, 2026, 2:39pm UTC](https://forum.reserve.org/t/report-bsdeth-quarterly-report-q1-2026/1516 "2026-04-15T14:39:49Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 7

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**Author:** ![zeb](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/forum.reserve.org/zeb/32/1181_2.png) [@zeb](https://forum.reserve.org/u/zeb)\
**Post date:** [April 20, 2026, 4:20am UTC](https://forum.reserve.org/t/report-bsdeth-quarterly-report-q1-2026/1516/7 "2026-04-20T04:20:24Z")

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> [@ham](#):
>
> Raises the question of whether deeper alignment with index DTFs should be prioritised as a long-term sticky growth strategy
> 
> Should bsdETH explore similar integrations to attract more durable, non-leveraged capital? Or focus on strengthening existing DeFi-native distribution first?

Let’s say we do. @ivanhalen0x @griffpeer Is this something you would pick up/continue then?

> [@zeb](#):
>
> > - Liquidity reductions across Aerodrome indicate LP capital has not yet returned post-deleveraging  
> > → Should incentives be considered to support liquidity recovery?
> 
> Would incentives in this case be bribes to veAERO holders?

And if it indeed were bribes, those bribes do fatten APRs for veAERO holders to vote on pools, which then fatten the incentives for LPs to be there. But current prices mean bribes do not return their equivalent in AERO, which is also IMO one of the reasons the bribe market crashed. TVL did not crash along with bribes, nor did swap fees, so the whole bribe market its legitimacy is debatable.

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