RFCs Posted
This section highlights all the RFCs I have posted since my last delegation platform update. It includes links and the RFC summary.
[RFC] Upgrade bsdETH to Release 4.2.0
This proposal recommends upgrading bsdETH to Reserve Protocol v4.2.0 to align it with the latest supported smart contract release. The upgrade consists of a single onchain spell that upgrades core contract implementation contracts and rotates governance and collateral plugins to their v4.2.0 equivalents.
A single onchain vote is required to execute both this upgrade and to clean-up the onchain state.
[RFC] ETHplus Upgrade to Release 4.2.0 and Removal of Legacy Onchain State
This proposal recommends upgrading ETHplus to Reserve Protocol v4.2.0 to align it with the latest supported smart contract release. The upgrade consists of a single onchain spell that upgrades core contract implementation contracts and rotates governance and collateral plugins to their v4.2.0 equivalents.
The proposal also aims to remove legacy onchain state. Specifically, obsolete TimelockControllers that still retain pauser and freezer roles will be removed. These controllers were not removed after the v3.4.0 upgrade and represent an unnecessary governance grief vector.
[RFC] eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 26-02-2026
An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal.
Original Revenue Share Programme Proposal.
Governance Judgement and RFC Commentary
A record of my direct engagement with RFCs including praise, criticism and constructive challenge since my last update. These comments are shared to demonstrate how I evaluate proposals and where I believe the protocol should or should not evolve in the future.
ETHplus Rebalance Q1 2026 - Step 1 Report
This report was posted as a comment under the original Q1 Rebalance Proposal. The report was mandated as part as the original proposal and only after a positive report was posted could we rebalance into the final basket. Given the favourable report, step 2 was posted for IP vote shortly after. However, execution has been delayed by the global pause on Yield DTF trading after a bug was found in third-party codebase. I expect this rebalance to be finalised onchain in the coming week.
ETHplus Revenue Share Adjustment
I supported opening the conversation around adjusting ETHplus revenue share, noting it is long overdue given reduced staking risk and ETHplus’ current unprofitability. Without structural change, ETHplus is increasingly likely to be sunset and some repricing of holder yield and RSR staking rewards feels unavoidable.
I highlighted that the impact on ETHplus holders is relatively modest. Post Q1 rebalance, increasing the take rate from 5% to 10% would reduce net holder yield by roughly 14bps while improving sustainability. I remain confident the basket can still outperform the stETH benchmark on a risk adjusted basis.
RSR stakers see a larger reduction in direct revenue, which I believe aligns with their reduced risk profile. In practice, I expect repricing through lower participation rather than a straight drop in APY. This should be monitored closely and I plan to track it in future reports.
[RFC] Reserve Delegates Plan Proposal
I strongly support progressing a delegate programme and welcomed the shift toward a pragmatic pilot approach. My view is that a trial programme should be lightweight, self policing and native to the ecosystem, avoiding external tooling or paid mercenary delegates at this stage. This limits overhead, unnecessary RSR selling and complexity while allowing the model to evolve later if successful.
I argued the programme mandate and methodology should be ratified onchain, with ABC Labs retaining discretion over how their delegated stake is allocated within those parameters. I am against delegate elections which tend to become popularity contests and add governance friction.
I also expressed that index DTFs should be excluded from the initial pilot due to current governance limitations around basket rebalances. Compensation should be retrospective, simple and tied to participation, ideally on a quarterly cadence and paid in RSR. Overall, I see a pilot delegate programme as achievable today and a positive step toward sustainable decentralisation if scoped carefully.
Implementation Proposal Votes
[eUSD] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2026-1-28
Vote: FOR
Earlier this month after further discussion in the Reserve TG, Sawyer has stepped down as eUSD DTF champion. Nevin acknowledged the inequity and quickly broke ground on changes gaining approval from UGLYCASH to reduce the revenue earned on balances held from 100% to 90%. I have absorbed Sawyers duties and will continue posting revenue share updates and move to ratify the 90/10 split onchain next week. Bullish on positive change for eUSD and increased programme clarity in the coming months.
[bsdETH] Upgrade bsdETH to Release 4.2.0
Vote: FOR
I voted for this proposal because it upgrades bsdETH to the latest supported protocol release, reducing security and operational risk from running outdated code. It also aligns bsdETH with audited features that improve safety and future governance flexibility without changing the current basket or parameters.
[ETHplus] Rebalance Proposal Q1 2026 - Step 2
Vote: FOR
I voted for this proposal as the interim report was favourable for further optimisation. By increasing the weETH allocation and concurrently reducing rETH and frxETH allocations we are able to greatly improve the executional depth of ETHplus while maintaining yield profiles above the benchmark.
[ETHplus] revenue share adjustment
Vote: FOR
I support the direction of this proposal as it addresses ETHplus’s current lack of profitability and sets out a credible path to long term sustainability, reducing the risk of the product being sunset. While the changes impact both holders and RSR stakers, I believe the trade-offs are reasonable and that yield can be recovered through future collateral optimisation. The introduction of a protocol fee is also a meaningful step toward greater decentralisation and future community-led incentive management.
[USD3] Upgrade to Protocol Version 4.2.0.
Vote: FOR
I voted for this proposal because it upgrades USD3 to the latest supported protocol release, reducing security and operational risk from running outdated code. It also aligns USD3 with audited features that improve safety and future governance flexibility without changing the current basket or parameters.
[Yield DTFs] Disable batch auctions
Vote: FOR
I voted for this proposal because it permanently deprecates the batch auction mechanism in yield DTFs after a critical division-by-zero vulnerability was discovered in the third-party EasyAuction contract, eliminating a latent risk even though it was never exploited. Removing this unused legacy feature improves protocol safety and allows normal DTF operations to resume without exposure to avoidable contract risk.