Ham Delegate Platform

[ham]

Key Info

• Delegate ENS: ham-delegate.eth
• Delegate Address: 0x49B4564cb533E092D43C628386258F0B78D86c52
• Telegram: @HamDeFi
• Discord: Ham6869
• Twitter: https://x.com/HamDefi

If you are unsure how to delegate through the Reserve Protocol app I’ve recorded a short video tutorial which you can find here.

Introduction

Gm guys, some of you might have seen me kicking around the Reserve Protocol forum, in the discord or even IRL this year at ethDenver or Monetarium 2 but I wanted to introduce myself formally here as well just in case you haven’t.

I’m Ham, I’ve been a community member aka bag holder since 2019, actively contributing through various protocol iterations, all the way from V1 of the protocol, RSV and RPay all the way to where we are today with Yield and Index DTFs. My main focus at present is championing the ETH based Yield DTFs; ETHplus, bsdETH and dgnETH but I also lend my voice and vote where I can on other DTFs when I get the chance.

My main motivation for setting up this delegation platform is based on 0xJMG’s comments on a previous eUSD revenue share proposal. In his comments he outlined his rational for delegate platforms from active community members and how this platform can not only be used vote delegation but also a location to efficiently log receipts of governance participation and my personal rationale behind decisions. With this in mind I hope this delegation platform can enhance governor transparency and accountability and also serve as a guide for others on how to contribute effectively, fostering an inviting and open community that you are proud to be a part of.

Why You Should Delegate to Me

Reserve protocol governance is still immature with the majority of proposals passing on-chain voting with five or less governors voting. I get that not everyone has the time or gas to vote consistently on every proposal and instead becomes rationally disengaged deferring the decision-making to larger holders, assuming they have the protocol’s best interests at heart. Up until now this has been largely true but it may not be true forever. I believe delegation platforms solve this.

My delegation platform is independent and not bound by commercial interests, enabling me to focus on protocol health, resilience and long-term utility over short-term or commercial incentives. I aim to do this by advocating for decentralisation, alignment with RToken mandates, participation in public forums and community-aligned decision-making.

Today, I am asking for your delegation so I can vote on your behalf and make your voice heard.

What Voters Can Expect from Me

• While most of my time is spent thinking about ETH based Yield DTFs and participate in governance protocol wide, including both yield and index DTFs.
• Transparent and well-reasoned votes that reflect the interests of RSR holders like me and you.
• Consistent efforts to decentralise governance by empowering the community’s voice and independent thought.
• Clear and digestible receipts of my voting so you can use this platform to stay informed without spending hours updating yourself on every vote each week.
• A commitment to fostering an open and inclusive community that you are proud to be a part of.
• Development of a service provision similar to the ACIs Skywards programme, providing a service to support stakeholders who want to participate in Reserve Protocol governance including community members who don’t know where to start or supporting protocols submitting RFCs / IPs that align with established templates and governance cadences.

Previous Governance Participation

Reserve Protocol Forum

I’ve highlighted some of my more notable contributions to the ecosystem but you can view the entire summary here.

Addition of Flux’s FTokens to the eUSD collateral basket (May 2023), the first documented collateral basket change proposal in Reserve’s history.

Addition of ETHx to the ETHplus collateral basket, Step 1 (Sept 2024) and Step 2 (Nov 2024)

Removal of apxETH and addition of the Morpho RE7 WETH vault to the dgnETH collateral basket (Jan 2025)

Liquidity analysis of the ETHplus collateral basket (June 2025)

Quarterly Reports; ETHplus, bsdETH, dgnETH

Some Closing Thoughts

To be clear I’m not connected to any individuals or organisations and all views shared are my own. I’m doing this to be more transparent, accountable and so we have a platform to guide others towards more effective contribution.

Please drop feedback below or reach out via any of the socials above. I’ll aim to update this platform weekly with vote receipts, rationale, and other relevant contributions.

Let’s make Reserve governance something worth showing up for.

Delegation Disclaimer

Delegating the voting power of your assets on protocols like Reserve involves several risks. While delegation allows others to vote on your behalf, you relinquish direct control over governance decisions that may impact protocol parameters, asset listings, and upgrades. Firstly, delegates may vote in ways misaligned with your own interests, and in such cases you have limited recourse. Additionally, delegation systems operate via smart contracts, which may carry risks such as bugs, exploits, or unintended behavior. However,

In the case of delegation on the Reserve protocol delegation is non-custodial and can be revoked instantly at any time, allowing you to reassert control over your governance rights when needed,the smart contracts have been heavily audited and live for over two years with zero exploits and delegation has no impact of your staked RSR yield as no fees are charged.

[starl3xx]

Ham is smart, thoughtful, and hard working — the exact kind of person you love to have active in governance

[0xJMG]

Great proposal.

I have delegated USD3, ETH+ and eUSD stakes to Ham.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER.

[Sawyer]

Ham is an excellent governor and a long time contributor in the Reserve Ecosystem. I recommend delegating to him.

[pete]

Ham has done a lot of work for the DAO and always appears to have the DAO’s best interests in mind. I think if you plan to delegate your voting power to someone, delegating to Ham would be a great option.

[Raphael_Anode]

Ham is the kind of high-agency governerd that any community dreams of. While no DTFs have formalized delegate programs yet, this kind of initiative creates the reality we want to live in.

Delegating my personal stRSR to this outstanding contributor.

[signal]

Ham has consistently demonstrated strong engagement and thoughtfulness in Reserve governance discussions.

I strongly recommend delegating your votes to Ham — your delegation will be in good hands.

[ham]

gm everyone, first of all I just want to say I’m super grateful for all the nice comments under this post. Love that there is a good mix of Reserve team, DeFi chads, external service providers and partner protocols, appreciate each and every one of you <3

From now on I’ll continue to comment on this forum post updating those interested on my vote receipts, rationale and other relevant contributions. Over the past year I’ve seen governance activity peak and trough so I don’t want to commit to weekly updates in periods of little to no activity but will endeavour to update this post at least monthly and more frequently during busy periods.

Okay, so let’s kick this off…

Collateral Basket Change Proposal: Adding Wrapped OETH (wOETH) to the dgnETH Collateral Basket

Vote: FOR

Rational: A contentious proposal, going directly against the dgnETH mandate. I eventually voted yes, despite arguing against it in the forums. I did this because it’s my opinion that dgnETH should be yield seeking above all else, OETH had recently deployed a new Curve pool that pushed their yield up ~1% higher than the incumbent, Morpho RE7 ETH vault. However, we’ve since seen OETH yield to drop down below the RE7 ETH vault and even below the average LST market rate. A vote I’m not proud to say I supported. Lesson learnt.

USD3 Collateral Basket Change Proposal 4

Vote: FOR

Rational: No brainer to swap from sDAI (APY: 2.25%) to sUSDS (APY: 4.5%) now the plug-in is live.

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-07-08

Vote: FOR

Rational: I see the fintech revenue share programme as the only avenue of growth available to eUSD and will continue to support their growth as per the original mandate for now, giving time for the concerns on the programme’s SOPs to be addressed.

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-07-22

Vote: FOR

Rational: Same as above.

Collateral Basket Change Proposal: Add Re7 WETH Morpho Vault (dgnETH)

Vote: FOR

Rational: Increases the diversification and yield profile of dgnETH while working towards aligning the collateral basket with its original mandate.

My comments / concerns on the eUSD Revenue Share Programme

I’m a strong supporter of the programme and believe eUSD’s growth will be led by fintechs, but not if it comes at the ongoing expense of stakers. I’d like to see clearer transparency from fintechs, fewer votes, and a shared understanding of acceptable over-collateralisation going forward.

[ham]

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-08-06

Vote: FOR

I’m a strong supporter of the programme and believe eUSD’s growth will be led by fintechs, but not if it comes at the expense of stakers. I’d like to see clearer transparency from fintechs, a change to the current voting format, and a shared understanding of acceptable over-collateralisation between the community and fintechs going forward.

I will continue to support the programme as per the original mandate for now, giving time for healthy discussion to continue and for any concerns raised on the programme’s SOPs to be addressed.

[ham]

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-08-20

Vote: FOR

Rational same as above. I will evaluate my stance on the rev share programme at the end of the quarter an will only continue to support the programme if I see steps being made towards positive change.

[ham]

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-09-03

Vote: FOR

Rational same as above. I will evaluate my stance on the rev share programme at the end of the quarter an will only continue to support the programme if I see steps being made towards positive change.

[RFC] Modelling how ETHplus would react to a deep and sustained stETH depeg and what actions we can take via governance to mitigate loss

Building on Robdogeth’s work on the stETH depeg i’ve dived deep into the protocol parameters of ETHPlus to evaluate the outcome of a deep and sustained depeg in stETH, gamed a worst-case scenario which would see holders lose 10% on holdings and made suggestions on how the product could mitigate loss for holders and RSR stakers.

Should we continue monitoring and fine tuning these parameters or turn off depeg detection entirely?

[ham]

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-09-03

Vote: FOR

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-09-17

Vote: FOR

Rational same as above. I will evaluate my stance on the rev share programme at the end of the quarter an will only continue to support the programme if I see steps being made towards positive change.

[ETHplus RFC] Collateral Basket Change proposal #12 - Addition of weETH

Basket change proposal based on the outcome of the Q4 Liquidity Report. I feel ETHplus’ growth is now constrained by the liquidity of it’s constituent collaterals and without an amendment to the collateral basket we will not see any meaningful growth. By design LSTs offer redemption in one of two ways; 1:1 via the withdrawal queue or via a DEX LP, accepting the mark-to-market loss. The protocol however has to chose the latter which is why it demands deep on-chain liquidity for it’s constituent collaterals. Despite now indexing the top LST products on mainnet there isn’t enough on-chain liquidity to satisfy mints and redemptions of ETHplus at scale. Which is why this proposal recommends a change to the ETHplus mandate to include LRT collaterals and add weETH to the collateral basket. Including weETH strengthens ETHplus by diversifying collateral, removing liquidity bottlenecks and alleviating existing concentration risks. The addition is designed to improve scalability, enhance minting and redemption efficiency, and ensure ETHplus remains competitive as both a resilient collateral index and a yield-optimized instrument.

[ham]

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-10-01

Vote: FOR

The quarter has closed on eUSD with another great report produced by @Sawyer. Appreciate that the transparency concerns have been taken onboard by Ugly Cash, the fintech with the largest eUSD holding, who have backed up Sawyers report with one of their own, detailing key growth and eUSD usage metrics.

While there has been no definitive resolution to the other concerns raised, level of RSR over-collateralisation and governor fatigue, these issues are slowly being address with the amount of RSR staked on eUSD maintaining at 2.5B and confirmation from @mattimost that optimistic governance is being explored / developed by the core team in Q4.

With these matters addressed / being prioritised I will continue voting FOR on future Revenue Share Update Proposals.

[dgnETH RFC] - Collateral Basket Change Proposal 7 - Updating the ETH+/WETH Convex LP Plugin

This proposal seeks to update the dgnETH collateral basket by migrating its 75% allocation from the Convex CryptoSwap ETH+/ETH LP to the StableSwap variant. The migration aligns the dgnETH basket with ETHplus’s own liquidity optimisations. The new StableSwap pool offers tighter spreads for pegged assets, reduced slippage on large trades, and improves ETHplus scalability. The StableSwap pool has recently delivered higher yields than the CryptoSwap pool (5.91% vs. 2.27% 30d average), though dilution is expected as liquidity migrates, mitigated in part by a subsequent migration of incentives by ABC Labs. In addition, the new plugin introduces gas optimisations that cuts dgnETH transaction costs by ~33%, albeit with a modest increase in stale-data risk as it moves the plugin uses 24h refresh window compared to the current plugin which refreshes on every action.

I’d appreciate anyone keeping up-to-date on my delegation platform to join the conversation, positive or negative. If we don’t see any objections to this RFC I expect to graduate this proposal to on-chain voting next Monday, 10/20/2025.

[ham]

eUSD FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-10-15

Vote: FOR

I’m happy that the transparency concerns expressed by eUSD stakers have been addressed by UC with their excellent addendum to Sawyer’s quarterly report. However, I feel that the UC addendum has now set the standard for other Fintechs. An interesting conversation for another time would be: How long before we remove the Revenue share from Sentz given their blatant disregard for transparency?

As mentioned previous the other issues of RSR over-collateralisation and governor fatigue are being slowly addressed with the amount of RSR staked on eUSD maintaining at 2.5B and confirmation from Thomas that optimistic governance is being explored / developed by the core team in Q4.

With these matters addressed / prioritised I will continue voting FOR on future Revenue Share Update Proposals.

Sunsetting of dgnETH

ABC Labs has confirmed that incentives for the dgnETH/ETH+ Curve LP will be phased out by the 11th December 2025. Given dgnETH’s two-token model relied on emissions to sustain yields for sdgnETH stakers, the withdrawal of incentives removes its core value proposition. Combined with high operational overheads and engineering demands, I made the decision to wind down operations.

Emissions reduction schedule:

• 6 Nov – Vote submission for emissions change
• 13 Nov – 50% cut
• 27 Nov – Further 50% cut (down to 25% overall)
• 11 Dec – Final reduction to zero

This timeline gives holders a clear runway to unwind positions smoothly. I’m available to troubleshoot any withdrawals. You can find my TG on the original post above.

[dgnETH IP] Collateral Basket Change Proposal 7 - Updating the ETH+/WETH Convex LP Plugin

Vote: Abstain

The decision to phase out LP incentives and sunset dgnETH was made only hours before this proposal went live for voting. While going ahead with the vote would have beneficial to the Reserve ecosystem, deepening the new ETH+/WETH LP, voting ‘YAY’ on this proposal would have exposed dgnETH holders and RSR stakers to unnecessary risks. Especially since the only time we have seen RSR slashing in the past is when we have entered / exited LP positions. Given this risk, I abstained from the proposal and advised others to vote ‘NAY’ or do the same.

[ham]

[LCAP IP] Increasing Governance share of revenue from 5% to 10%

Vote: AGAINST

Distribution has and always will be key for the long-term growth of Index DTFs. By reducing the revenue share to it’s core contributors we’re reducing their motivation to promote the index through their own channels restricting growth and RSR burn by association.

Also, this proposal hasn’t followed the standard governance flow. By skipping the RFC stage, as mentioned by @starl3xx, key contributors and the wider community have not had the chance to share their opinion on the proposal. Based on this and comments in the Reserve TG regarding this proposal I consider this attack on LCAP governance and encourage everyone to vote against the proposal regardless of what it hopes to achieve.

[eUSD IP] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-10-29

Vote: FOR

I’m happy that the transparency concerns expressed by eUSD stakers have been addressed by UC with their excellent addendum to Sawyer’s quarterly report. While there are still concern to the FinTech Rev Share programme I trust these will be addressed in due course.

[ham]

[eUSD IP] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-11-11

[eUSD IP] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-11-27

Vote: FOR

I’m happy that the transparency concerns expressed by eUSD stakers have been addressed by UC and Sentz with their excellent addendum to Sawyer’s Q3 report. While there are still concerns with the FinTech Rev Share programme I trust the process and that these will be addressed in due course.

[ ETHplus IP] Proposal to Turn Off Default Detection for ETHplus Collateral Assets

Vote: FOR

I support the proposal given it’s in the best interests of both RSR stakers and ETHplus holders. The protocol always has to chose liquidity over entering the withdrawal queue. Considering this if we we’re to see a significant stETH depeg and the protocol was to complete the process of auctioning off it’s allocation it’s likely RSR stakers are completely wiped out and ETHplus holders are left with a ~10% haircut (based on previous models, admittedly modelled when TVL was 100% higher). A tough pill to swallow especially when we could see stETH re-peg shortly after. Due to the fact that as the protocol is a large holder of stETH we will likely see significant slippage during the sell off, this slippage will deepen the depeg and subsequently widen the arb opportunity, tempting more capital to enter the arb trade resulting in stETH price converging with it’s peg, as long as the underlying protocol is sound ofc!

Once turned off it’s business as usual with over-collateralisation still being used for basket rebalances and in the event of a depeg ETHplus holders are masters of their own destiny, exiting at whichever level they please rather than a forced exit with high slippage at 0.975.

[ham]

[eUSD IP] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-12-10

Vote: FOR

I’m happy that the transparency concerns expressed by eUSD stakers have been addressed by UC and Sentz with their excellent addendum to Sawyer’s Q3 report. While there are still concerns with the FinTech Revenue Share programme I hope that the open and honest discussion on the RSR Health forum post and imminent response from ABC Labs and Confusion Capital will improve ecosystem transparency, co-ownership and once again centre the RSR token in the ecosystem. If this is to be done properly I expect the current failings of the eUSD Revenue Sharing Programme to be addressed in the very near term.

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[COMMENT] RSR Health

I appreciate the work that has gone into the RSR Health discussion and the depth of engagement it has generated. It is also important to recognise genuine progress and external wins such as CMC20, which meaningfully improve Reserve’s visibility and credibility.

My Asterisks and Caveats:
1. Governance centralisation: Voting power concentration and limited independent participation risk weakening decentralisation and discouraging broader community engagement.
2. Governance flows: Key processes such as DTF basket rebalances lack clear sequencing, benchmarks, and guidance, making it difficult for governors to evaluate decisions confidently.
3. RSR burns: Burns are directionally positive but are not consistently scheduled, communicated, or highlighted, reducing their impact on sentiment and transparency.
4. Index DTF value accrual: Changes to revenue share and platform economics have not always been clearly surfaced, limiting predictability for long-term RSR holders.
5. eUSD mandate: The current mandate and revenue share framework lack clear targets, risk parameters, and long-term alignment for RSR stakers.
6. Index DTF governance and education: Governance remains siloed, with weak onboarding and education for new index DTFs, resulting in limited co-ownership and participation.

Why it matters: If these structural and transparency issues persist, RSR risks becoming increasingly peripheral as the ecosystem grows, despite strong product-level progress.

Suggested direction: Strengthen RSR value accrual and participation by improving transparency around governance power, formalising and communicating burn frameworks, unifying index DTF governance incentives, improving delegate education and onboarding, and clarifying long-term expectations around eUSD and index DTF economics.

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[RFC] ETHplus Mandate and DTF Methodology Update

This RFC aims to advance two closely linked ETHplus work streams:

1. Updating the ETHplus mandate, improving scalability by expanding the range of assets eligible for inclusion in the collateral basket; and

2. Codifying a formal ETHplus DTF methodology, in order to align with standards used by newer DTFs such as the CMC20 and LCAP, to establish clear selection principles, rebalancing guidelines, and standardised reporting requirements.

We must now consider updating the ETHplus mandate to include Liquid Restaking Tokens, LRTs to strengthen the DTF’s ability to remain both scalable and risk-adjusted in a market where LST liquidity is deteriorating. Incorporating high quality LRTs that meet the safety and liquidity standards of the existing mandate enables ETHplus to benefit from deeper collateral markets, more resilient liquidity profiles, and competitive yields without compromising its safety-first design.

To support this shift, the methodology outlined introduces a clear set of eligibility requirements and ongoing monitoring guidelines that equip governors to consistently evaluate assets, deliberate on concentration and liquidity risks, and ensure that any LRT exposure added to the basket remains aligned with ETHplus’ core objective of delivering reliable, risk-adjusted ETH yield.

I encourage all governors to review the methodology, share feedback on what resonates, and highlight areas that require further refinement. Once broad consensus is reached, I propose we progress with formal ratification via an on-chain vote.

[ham]

Implementation Proposal Votes

[eUSD IP] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2025-12-29

[eUSD IP] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2026-01-14

Vote: FOR

I have continued voting FOR these proposals over the last few months in good faith that meaningful change was coming. That certainly seemed to be the case with excellent addendums from UC and Sentz on the eUSD’s Q3 report and eUSD being flagged as a discussion point by myself and others in the community. The eUSD revenue share programme was subsequently discussed in the recent community call. However, the Rev Share programme was flagged only briefly by UC without a clear mandate or timeline for action being set. This coupled with the apparent lack of engagement by both participating fintechs who haven’t added an addendum to eUSD’s Q4 report yet or the eUSD champion who has disengaged with the RSR community on the forums is worrying and i’m concerned that without care for or true representation of RSR stakers we’ll continue with a revenue share programme that doesn’t eventually give value back to eUSD’s RSR stakers or centre the RSR token in the ecosystem.

At this stage I believe the threshold for action has been reached. I plan on discussing this with stakeholders and will consider drafting a proposal in the coming weeks to address the concerns i’ve previously outlined.

It’s great that we’ve been able to support the growth of UC and that this support has seen them become the largest holder of eUSD. The route has been proven and it would be great to see other fintechs hold eUSD but this cannot happen until the concerns raised have been resolved.

[eUSD IP] eUSD Old TimelockControllers Removal

Vote: FOR

Clean-up of onchain state. Removal of an old TimelockController address from Pauser, Long Freezer, and Short Freezer role. Removed in order to close off a potential griefing vector.

[ETHplus IP] ETHplus Rebalance Proposal Q1 2026 / Ratification of mandate and methodology update

Vote: FOR

This IP combined two linked work streams onchain to be decided upon in a single vote. Firstly, the ratification of a new mandate and the proposed methodology which enables the inclusions of LRTs in the basket and provides clarity for holders on the methodology used to rebalance the ETHplus basket and a rebalance proposal which saw sfrxETH and rETH allocations reduce by 6% and weETH be introduced into the basket at 12%. This basket is an interim basket with the final basket which will see sfrxETH and rETH be reduced by another 5% and weETH increase by a further 10% being brought onchain in the coming weeks after further evaluation of both the success of the first rebalance and liquidity conditions in the coming weeks.

Summaries of these two proposals can be found in the tables below.

[RFC] ETHplus Mandate and DTF Methodology Update

[RFC] ETHplus Rebalance Proposal Q1 2026

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Reports

[REPORT] ETHplus Quarterly Report Q4 2025

Summary

• Redemption liquidity across major LSTs has deteriorated this quarter, seen in the collateral basket with rETH and frxETH showing sustained weakness for a second consecutive quarter
• The collateral basket remains compliant on yield, diversification, and minting liquidity, but redemption slippage now exceeds the 0.5% threshold at around 5,000 ETH, well below the current ~6,700 tolerance
• Protocol level minting and redemption remain the most capital efficient entry and exit mechanism at scale, while secondary market liquidity becomes constrained quickly beyond small trade sizes
• A previously identified denominator mismatch error overstated basket slippage in earlier reports. The error has now been fully corrected but does reduce the lack of comparability been this and previous data sets

[REPORT] ETHplus Quarterly Report Q4 2025

Summary

• Q4 marked a sharp reversal from the growth seen in Q2 and Q3, with ETHplus market cap declining 71.4% quarter on quarter following broader market deleveraging after the 10/10 Balancer exploit.
• The drawdown was primarily liquidity driven, not structural. Basket composition, methodology, and diversification remained unchanged, with the diversification ratio holding steady at 65.5% across the year.
• Total ETHplus supply contracted by 60.3% over the quarter as large liquidity providers unwound positions to manage external losses across DeFi.
• Despite overall TVL contraction, ETHplus continued to expand composability, with new leveraged strategies launched on Gearbox and approximately 2,000 ETH of supply added across smaller venues.
• Gearbox emerged as a key distribution channel in Q4, with ETHplus selected as a launch asset for KPK curated vaults and seeing continued uptake despite the removal of incentives.
• ETHplus supply across Term Finance fully unwound during the quarter, highlighting ongoing sensitivity to layered risk perceptions during periods of market stress.
• Token holder and transfer metrics remained strong, with holders up 48% quarter on quarter and 90 day transfers increasing 186.9%, reinforcing continued organic usage despite declining TVL.
• Looking ahead, focus will shift toward improving venue diversification, strengthening execution liquidity through the upcoming basket rebalance, and rebuilding sustainable unincentivized supply.

[REPORT] bsdETH Quarterly Report Q4 2025

Summary

• Q4 marked an inflection point for bsdETH with sharp contraction across market cap ETH supply and DeFi supply following a period of stabilization in Q3
• The 79% decline in market cap cannot be explained by ETH price action alone and reflects large scale deleveraging and second order liquidity effects following the Balancer exploit
• Despite this contraction bsdETH maintained competitive staking yields and saw RSR staking increase by 17% over the quarter indicating continued confidence from long term participants
• Holder counts continued to grow however onchain activity declined materially with 90d transfers falling 84.7% highlighting reduced onchain activity
• DeFi supply contracted sharply across all venues with Morpho remaining the primary distribution channel despite experiencing the largest absolute drawdown, 91.5%
• Supply to index DTFs increased in relative importance with bsdETH beginning to establish itself as an emerging index allocation candidate for Base DTFs wanting exposure to ETH. Success in the area would be confirmed when LCAP allocates to bsdETH over ETH.
• Social media activity on the bsdETH X account was intentionally deprioritised in Q4 in favour of higher impact governance and distribution efforts across the broader ETH DTF ecosystem

[ham]

RFCs Posted

This section highlights all the RFCs I have posted since my last delegation platform update. It includes links and the RFC summary.

[RFC] Upgrade bsdETH to Release 4.2.0

This proposal recommends upgrading bsdETH to Reserve Protocol v4.2.0 to align it with the latest supported smart contract release. The upgrade consists of a single onchain spell that upgrades core contract implementation contracts and rotates governance and collateral plugins to their v4.2.0 equivalents.

A single onchain vote is required to execute both this upgrade and to clean-up the onchain state.

[RFC] ETHplus Upgrade to Release 4.2.0 and Removal of Legacy Onchain State

This proposal recommends upgrading ETHplus to Reserve Protocol v4.2.0 to align it with the latest supported smart contract release. The upgrade consists of a single onchain spell that upgrades core contract implementation contracts and rotates governance and collateral plugins to their v4.2.0 equivalents.

The proposal also aims to remove legacy onchain state. Specifically, obsolete TimelockControllers that still retain pauser and freezer roles will be removed. These controllers were not removed after the v3.4.0 upgrade and represent an unnecessary governance grief vector.

[RFC] eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 26-02-2026

An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal.

Original Revenue Share Programme Proposal.

Governance Judgement and RFC Commentary

A record of my direct engagement with RFCs including praise, criticism and constructive challenge since my last update. These comments are shared to demonstrate how I evaluate proposals and where I believe the protocol should or should not evolve in the future.

ETHplus Rebalance Q1 2026 - Step 1 Report

This report was posted as a comment under the original Q1 Rebalance Proposal. The report was mandated as part as the original proposal and only after a positive report was posted could we rebalance into the final basket. Given the favourable report, step 2 was posted for IP vote shortly after. However, execution has been delayed by the global pause on Yield DTF trading after a bug was found in third-party codebase. I expect this rebalance to be finalised onchain in the coming week.

ETHplus Revenue Share Adjustment

I supported opening the conversation around adjusting ETHplus revenue share, noting it is long overdue given reduced staking risk and ETHplus’ current unprofitability. Without structural change, ETHplus is increasingly likely to be sunset and some repricing of holder yield and RSR staking rewards feels unavoidable.

I highlighted that the impact on ETHplus holders is relatively modest. Post Q1 rebalance, increasing the take rate from 5% to 10% would reduce net holder yield by roughly 14bps while improving sustainability. I remain confident the basket can still outperform the stETH benchmark on a risk adjusted basis.

RSR stakers see a larger reduction in direct revenue, which I believe aligns with their reduced risk profile. In practice, I expect repricing through lower participation rather than a straight drop in APY. This should be monitored closely and I plan to track it in future reports.

[RFC] Reserve Delegates Plan Proposal

I strongly support progressing a delegate programme and welcomed the shift toward a pragmatic pilot approach. My view is that a trial programme should be lightweight, self policing and native to the ecosystem, avoiding external tooling or paid mercenary delegates at this stage. This limits overhead, unnecessary RSR selling and complexity while allowing the model to evolve later if successful.

I argued the programme mandate and methodology should be ratified onchain, with ABC Labs retaining discretion over how their delegated stake is allocated within those parameters. I am against delegate elections which tend to become popularity contests and add governance friction.

I also expressed that index DTFs should be excluded from the initial pilot due to current governance limitations around basket rebalances. Compensation should be retrospective, simple and tied to participation, ideally on a quarterly cadence and paid in RSR. Overall, I see a pilot delegate programme as achievable today and a positive step toward sustainable decentralisation if scoped carefully.

Implementation Proposal Votes

[eUSD] FinTech Revenue Share Update 2026-1-28

Vote: FOR

Earlier this month after further discussion in the Reserve TG, Sawyer has stepped down as eUSD DTF champion. Nevin acknowledged the inequity and quickly broke ground on changes gaining approval from UGLYCASH to reduce the revenue earned on balances held from 100% to 90%. I have absorbed Sawyers duties and will continue posting revenue share updates and move to ratify the 90/10 split onchain next week. Bullish on positive change for eUSD and increased programme clarity in the coming months.

[bsdETH] Upgrade bsdETH to Release 4.2.0

Vote: FOR

I voted for this proposal because it upgrades bsdETH to the latest supported protocol release, reducing security and operational risk from running outdated code. It also aligns bsdETH with audited features that improve safety and future governance flexibility without changing the current basket or parameters.

[ETHplus] Rebalance Proposal Q1 2026 - Step 2

Vote: FOR

I voted for this proposal as the interim report was favourable for further optimisation. By increasing the weETH allocation and concurrently reducing rETH and frxETH allocations we are able to greatly improve the executional depth of ETHplus while maintaining yield profiles above the benchmark.

[ETHplus] revenue share adjustment

Vote: FOR

I support the direction of this proposal as it addresses ETHplus’s current lack of profitability and sets out a credible path to long term sustainability, reducing the risk of the product being sunset. While the changes impact both holders and RSR stakers, I believe the trade-offs are reasonable and that yield can be recovered through future collateral optimisation. The introduction of a protocol fee is also a meaningful step toward greater decentralisation and future community-led incentive management.

[USD3] Upgrade to Protocol Version 4.2.0.

Vote: FOR

I voted for this proposal because it upgrades USD3 to the latest supported protocol release, reducing security and operational risk from running outdated code. It also aligns USD3 with audited features that improve safety and future governance flexibility without changing the current basket or parameters.

[Yield DTFs] Disable batch auctions

Vote: FOR

I voted for this proposal because it permanently deprecates the batch auction mechanism in yield DTFs after a critical division-by-zero vulnerability was discovered in the third-party EasyAuction contract, eliminating a latent risk even though it was never exploited. Removing this unused legacy feature improves protocol safety and allows normal DTF operations to resume without exposure to avoidable contract risk.

[0xJMG]

While I am not tracking all the ETH DTFs in detail, I remain in awe with Ham’s approach to comms and accountability and the “delegate platform” model we borrowed from Aave.

If you are new here I encourage you to trace Ham’s delegate platform to its origins and hope we take note that as Reserve moves to a more formal delegates program, that the standard for comms and accountability, and meritocracy with other delegates should be equal to or better than this example.