[RFC] Reserve Delegates Plan Proposal

I am spread thin right now, so if anything I post feels vague or off-base, please ask direct questions and tag me.

A few thoughts…

  1. Strong post @zeb! aligned with most points raised.

  2. Comms and accountability for top performing Delegates should probably match or exceed Ham’s delegate platform launched July 2025.

  3. I am a big fan of 6 month epochs in the delegates platform for small <$50M TVL assets and here is why:
    a. It is administratively a lot of work for ABC Labs and community to effectively do the Delegate “beauty contest” (described further below) at every epoch
    b. Community attention is finite, save some for PMF oriented explorations, even if that is not a governance delegate’s priority. We should not make the same mistake as eUSD 2025 overweighted governance busy-work and underweighted PMF pursuits (including the D in systemically important DTFs).

  4. Agree with the simple path @Raphael_Anode, let’s define, what minimum viable product is initially for Reserve. Maybe define the 1H and 2H 2026 goal-posts of what success would look like, and work backwards? Most people won’t engage deeply with the “how,” but a clear north star makes the destination tangible and memorable for more eyeballs.

  5. Top performing paid delegates should be able increase governance participation through inclusivity (representing/enrolling the people) and working on something that matters. On one hand, the largest, systemically important DTFs should have a strong “D.” On the other hand, DTF deployers or paid champions/delegates should be able to “gather people around the campfire.” If they cannot do this, it might be an early sign PMF won’t be found.

  6. I really like Nevin’s delegation amount-multiple idea with skin in the game. Marry that with a standard requirement that Delegates have a Delegate Platform like Ham, and ABC can allocate delegation on both what they stake as well as the size of the group gathered around their campfire. Compounding flywheel.

  7. Fwiw @nevin.freeman , DRF is Decentralized Ranger Folio.

  8. @Raphael_Anode in your poll I’d imagine a contest or delegate race to be manifested in a token gated snapshot vote, so i think your poll split the answer there. But maybe you have a better implementation idea?

  9. There’s been discussion about positioning the DRF as a “mega delegate.” At face value, I don’t recommend it. The DRF is neither a corporation nor a DAO. It carries no formal accountability or legal obligation. Framing it as a mega delegate implies unified alignment and responsibility across members, which is unrealistic.When a decision later proves flawed, blame diffuses and ownership blurs. That dynamic may weaken trust in the DRF. This mirrors the logic in the DRF charter: individuals should propose, win, and deliver grants. The DRF can accelerate coordination, but individuals own and deliver outcomes. If the DRF eventually becomes a legal entity, my view could evolve.

  10. You’re raising an important point, @ham. But why couldn’t LCAP rebalances require updated benchmarks as a formal prerequisite to rebalance approval? What advantage does the current configuration offer compared to embedding that requirement directly into approval?

  11. For clarity, explicitly answering Nevin’s 7 questions:
    a. How should delegates be selected? Each delegate would maintain a public platform similar to Ham’s. We could run semiannual epochs evaluating each Delegate platform with token-gated Snapshot voting to select winners (big opportunity for community ownership). Rather than over-defining the system too early and adding unnecessary overhead, we let early market feedback do the sorting. The community will recognize strong performance when it appears. If we misallocate in the first epoch, we adjust and improve in the next.
    b. Which RTokens/DTFs should be included? Recommend we master the top 5-6 systemically important DTFs before branching out. Lets guard our finite attention to be allocated for other RSR health or PMF aspirations.
    c. How should delegation amounts be determined? A multiple of their existing stake + multiple of what they have attracted to their Delegate platform. If you want to get fancy use a quadratic function to increase amount based on # of “trusted” wallets delegating to them - these are master campfire builders!
    d. Should delegates be compensated? If yes, how? Simple, basic and appropriate for proven RSR missionaries. Probably flat cash amount 50% at beginning of epoch, 50% at end of epoch. Or 100% upfront. Reinventing payment schemas is not the highest leverage thing we can be doing rn.
    e. What accountability mechanisms should exist? Underperformers voted out in next epoch.
    f. Should the delegation program structure itself be put to an RSR snapshot vote? Sure, yes. Good idea to get some practice. Break a leg.
    g. Should RToken holders have separate veto power over governance decisions affecting the products they hold, independent of RSR governance? This sounds like costly functionality and assumes governors will not do what is best for the RToken. Recommend we trust incentive alignment and can always cross that bridge when we get there, if it becomes a problem.

  12. For Zeb, Nevin, Jake, Raphael, Nick and DTF deployers. Launching a delegate program is one challenge; driving awareness and sustained participation is another entirely. If compensation is modest, we’re relying on true missionaries, not mercenaries. That means consistent communication before, during, and after each epoch, plus a promotion flywheel where Reserve, Anode, DRF, and (maybe even?) Lodge reinforce one another. In a world of algos and memory-holes, its on us to make it stick. There’s something to learn from Tyler the Creator not just dropping the beat, but making it echo: https://x.com/blakeir/status/1599779891200655361

  13. Lingering concern: governing DTFs without meaningful influence over broader Reserve strategy and treasury may leave us spinning a small cog in an incomplete flywheel. PMF could take four months or four years, and some of that timeline depends on market forces we cannot predict or control. By contrast, RSR health initiatives such as increasing locking durations and expanding RSR utility sit squarely within our control and could be advanced through focused sprints. Healthy RSR is an accelerant for PMF, stacking the odds in our favor, widening the ranks and giving Reserve a compounding Army for wartime.

Plenty of other gems in this post and comments I didn’t touch on.
Love seeing some wind at the community’s back. :sailboat:

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