Really impressed by the quality of ideas, supporting analysis and discourse coming from Nevin, Ranger, DRF members and the broader RSR community.
RSR unlocking has long been contentious, accruing trust debt when decisions are centralized but their consequences are borne collectively.
As Nevin stated, the upcoming vote is effectively a choice between adopting NARR-gated unlocks or continuing deliberation, with the prior Bitcoin-inspired Slower Wallet remaining the fallback.
I’ve particularly appreciated the work Ranger put into his proposal. Since much of this discussion traces back to the earlier Bitcoin-shaped emissions debate, I mapped the differences in this comparison table. If you see anything incorrect, please flag it and I will make the edits.
| Lever | Bitcoin | Reserve Slower Wallet, Bitcoin-shaped curve | Nevin: NARR milestone | Ranger: DTF/RSR programmatic burn-linked |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TLDR | Consensus issues 3.125 BTC per valid block; subsidy halves every 210,000 blocks toward 21M. | Performance-independent calendar releases start at 190M RSR/week and decline 0.3843% weekly. | Prove $2.5M NARR, then unlock up to 3B RSR, subject to the 30-day price rules. | For each 1 programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees, unlock 0.5–0.8 RSR. |
| Revenue-to-unlock path | Proof of work → valid block → node validation → block subsidy paid to miner | Calendar → scheduled wallet release → unlock | Product demand → revenue → NARR calculation → $2.5M milestone → price test → unlock | Product demand → DTF fees → programmatic RSR purchased/burned → proportional unlock |
| Unlock amount and cadence | 3.125 BTC/block; halves to 1.5625 at block 1,050,000, expected around 2028 | Geometric decay: W_n = 190M × 0.996157^(n−1); 8.97B cumulative in weeks 1–52. |
3B RSR after the first $2.5M NARR milestone; later milestones undefined | Continuous: unlock 0.5–0.8 RSR per 1 programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees. |
| Price guardrails | n/a | n/a | $0 below $0.005; 3B through $0.015; $45M cap above $0.015 | n/a |
| Comparable hurdle-rate estimate | n/a | n/a | 3B RSR after the first $2.5M NARR | 3B RSR after… v1—0.5 unlock ratio; 33% of buybacks burned: 3B ÷ 0.5 ÷ 33% ÷ 2 years × $0.005–$0.015 = $45M–$135M/yearv2—0.8 unlock ratio; 90% of buybacks burned: 3B ÷ 0.8 ÷ 90% ÷ 2 years × $0.005–$0.015 = $10.4M–$31.3M/year |
| Optional accelerated unlock | n/a | n/a | n/a | Burn 1–2 locked RSR to unlock 1 RSR. |
| Circulating supply impact | Approximately 164,250 BTC/year at the ten-minute block target; issuance halves every 210,000 blocks. | 8.97B available in year 1 plus an estimated 7.34B in year 2, offset by programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees. | Up to 3B RSR unlocked, offset by programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees. | Guarantees deflationary: linked cycles reduce supply by 0.2–0.5 RSR per programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees. |
| Cost treatment in unlocks | n/a | n/a | Subtracts third-party shares and incentives; excludes operating costs and some acquisition costs using two-year-payback judgment. | Uses programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees; does not deduct incentive or operating costs. |
| Verification | Fully onchain | Public formula and withdrawals; manually administered, not enforced by a verified emissions contract. | NARR uses offchain company accounting plus onchain incentives; the reported result is not independently reproducible. | Programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees is onchain; the unlock ratio remains programmable. |
| Governance and enforceability | Consensus-enforced | Manual team withdrawals; four-week Slower Wallet delay; Bitcoin emissions curve not hardcoded as originally planned. | Snapshot votes; program parameters are non-binding; team analysis and presentation of financials. | Snapshot votes; program parameters are non-binding unless hardcoded; additional financial analysis is removed because unlocks follow programmatic RSR burned from DTF fees. |
| Tied to value creation | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Transparently allocated | Yes | No | No | No |
| Trust debt Mutable promises + ambiguity = overhead-consuming disputes |
Protocol | Company | Company + community Snapshot vote | Company + community Snapshot vote |
| Centralized supply overhang FDV and perceived governance influence |
Satoshi has approximately 5% of supply | Reserve has approximately 40% of supply | Reserve has approximately 40% of supply | Reserve has approximately 40% of supply |
| 5B unlocked / non-utilized RSR | n/a | Strong rainy-day fund; no restrictions | Strong rainy-day fund; no restrictions | Strong rainy-day fund; no restrictions |
The NARR milestone proposal is unquestionably better than the Slower Wallet’s Bitcoin-shaped curve. NARR does not necessarily make RSR structurally healthier, but it is meaningful progress.
The interesting prompt raised by Ranger’s proposal is: What are we optimizing for?
- Reserve’s ability to fund PMF experimentation and growth without excessive friction
- DTF/RSR ecosystem legibility for capital allocators and builders
- Reducing FUD vectors related to RSR supply
- Activating an army of RSR holders who also hold DTFs and tell their friends
- Or something else? (If so, please say so.)
I believe these goals can coexist, and the table above gives a few hints on what needs more work. Ranger’s programmatic unlocks tied to existing DTF-fee burns check more boxes than NARR milestone unlocks, but Nevin raises a compelling objection: Reserve could become capital-constrained precisely when successful growth demands greater investment.
That concern is addressable because neither framework is hardcoded and both are non-binding. Rules can change, as they have before:
2022–2024 Slow Wallet → 2024–2026 Slower Wallet → current proposal → probably another iteration within a few years.
A potentially stronger hybrid would combine Ranger’s programmatic unlocks tied to DTF-fee burns with a community vote authorizing additional funding for exceptional growth opportunities.
Ranger has separately suggested a team-initiated 1:1 burn-and-unlock route; I would prefer a explicitly presented opportunity proposal and vote when exceptional situations arise.
We are unlikely to settle that system before the upcoming vote.
For now, NARR is better than the status quo—just as the Bitcoin-shaped Slower Wallet was better than the Slow Wallet.
Staying true to incremental progress, I support the NARR unlock proposal as an interim solution to whatever comes next, but it does not go far enough toward the broader interest of making RSR more structurally healthy.
If possible, consider delaying the Thursday Aug 27 vote and allow the community and ABC Labs to reach stronger consensus around a hybrid that balances Reserve’s capital flexibility with improving RSR health and supply predictability and legibility.