Reminder: OPEN is governed by the SQUILL token. Get your SQUILL and vote-lock to receive vlSQUILL-OPEN in order to participate in governance.
The proposal aims to:
Increase the cost to reach quorum and pass proposals
Reduce spam and low-effort governance attacks
Extend participation windows for a low-attention voter base
Add additional buffer before execution
The scope of changes are consistent adjustments across Basket, Non-Basket, and DAO governance parameters, including proposal thresholds, quorum, voting delays, voting periods, and execution delays.
The summary table below illustrates the proposed changes.
Governance
Parameter
Current Params
Proposed Change
Open Basket Changes
Voting delay
1 day
2 days
Voting period
3 days
5 days
Proposal threshold
1%
10%
Quorum
10%
no change
Execution delay / timelock
1 day
3 days
OPEN Non Basket (fees, params)
Voting delay
2 days
no change
Voting period
3 days
5 days
Proposal threshold
1%
10%
Quorum
10%
no change
Execution delay / timelock
2 days
3 days
OPEN DAO (settings of vlDAO)
Voting delay
2 days
no change
Voting period
3 days
5 days
Proposal threshold
1%
10%
Quorum
10%
no change
Execution delay / timelock
2 days
3 days
This RFC begins a 5-day discussion and challenge period for the proposed changes.
Community members are encouraged to submit alternative parameter proposals and supporting rationales in the comments.
Just like to flag the proposal threshold, 10% seems a little high. Currently the-llamas.eth is the top voting address with ~9%. With this in mind, at present, no one would be able to propose changes.
For comparison the largest index DTF, CMC20, sets this at 0.1% for basket governance and 1% for the rest.
This is a good question, would this make it impossible to submit new proposals? Otherwise, the proposal looks directionally correct, threshold bump is a good move and appreciate the participation window extension.
What about permissioning proposal making? Allowing certain people to propose but not others.
Imo this is a good practice to safeguard a project. And a desirable pathway for those truly invested.
If someone can just buy 600 or 1000$ of tokens and create a proposal, this doesn’t seem ideal to me.
If this is possible, I’d support its implementation. As an OPEN holder, I’d sleep better knowing that proposal creation is limited to contributors with proven alignment, such as @0xJMG and @curvecap.
Social contracts have to be enforced, but there is no one accountable for this, no centralized team, etc. Contributors want the OPEN experiment to thrive even if they for some reason are absent. This is much more difficult on a small TVL asset like OPEN currently is. Good ole cold start problem(s), as you know. @Raphael_Anode.
@glyph There has been no proposal spamming so far. if you could, what specific numbers would you suggest? Best if we do not have room to hallucinate.
5% still feels high to me especially if there hasn’t been any proposal spamming this far. Governance participation is a solid and somewhat sticky entry point into any DTF ecosystem. I’d be concerned that by setting this too high and concentrating the role between a trust few is a net negative and opposes new entrants.
Instead, I’d be more inclined to keep it at 1% and trust the other governance safeguards e.g trusted governors with significant skin in the game, a suitable quorum and the DTF guardian to protect against malicious or unaligned proposals from passing. This can then be reassessed at a later date if it’s found that the volume of maligned proposals is increasing.
I’d also caution against attaching a fixed dollar value to the threshold. That approach feels problematic given $SQUILL is a volatile asset. During periods of rapid price appreciation, the effective entry threshold could rise significantly and unintentionally price out new participants, especially given how thin Curve liquidity is atm.
Agree… social contract and low technical barrier seems right.
We’ve this tendency in crypto to try to engineer social problems away.
And it doesn’t seem to work well.
$OPEN has great momentum and awesome contributors. More, it has a group that is coordinating tightly.
Leveraging that vs a solution that works semi-well for very large systems with anons running about seems much more conducive to me.
The discussion period that began 5 days ago has concluded. Thank you to everyone who contributed.
A key takeaway from the discussion is that the community coalesced around no changes to proposal or quorum thresholds.
Onchain improvement proposals have now been posted for Voting Delay, Voting Period, and Execution Delay across the following three governance areas. This requires voting three times:
The TLDR: these 3 proposals bring parity across all vlSQUILL-OPEN governance, setting:
Voting Delay: 2 days
Voting Period: 5 days
Execution Delay: 3 days
Easy way to remember: 2-5-3, or 10 days total.
Currently, each part of the DAO runs on a different cadence. OPEN Basket voting begins in approximately 24 hours, while Non Basket and vlDAO voting begin in approximately 48 hours.
For anyone looking to vote on all 3 around the same time, the optimal voting window begins:
May 13 at 11:30am PT / 2:30pm ET / 7:30pm GMT
And ends 48 hours later:
May 15 at 11:30am PT / 2:30pm ET / 7:30pm GMT
Going forward, these proposals should improve consistency and expand voting windows across vlSQUILL-OPEN governance.
If you spot any errors in the proposals, please flag them in the comments.
