[RFC] ixEDEL governance proposal: semi-annual rebalancing, a Treasury-backed addition, and the July 2026 rebalance

[sagix.io]

ixEDEL governance proposal: semi-annual rebalancing, a Treasury-backed addition, and the July 2026 rebalance

Sagix Club Edelweiss (ixEDEL), Ethereum mainnet, 0xe4a10951f962e6cb93cb843a4ef05d2f99db1f94

Summary

This proposal asks RSR governance to adopt a semi-annual rebalancing cadence on January 5 and July 5, to execute the July 2026 rebalance back to target weights, to add Ondo’s Treasury-backed USDY at 10% inside the existing 40% stablecoin sleeve, and to migrate the Swiss franc sleeve from idle ZCHF to the yield-bearing Savings Vault token svZCHF once Reserve adds routing support. The four-bucket structure of yield stablecoins, gold, Swiss franc, and Bitcoin is unchanged, as are the fees and the governance surface. The basket moves from six tokens to seven, inside the fifteen-token limit.

Rebalancing cadence: semi-annual

The original RFC set an annual base case. We propose a fixed semi-annual schedule instead, on January 5 and July 5. A 180-day cycle matches the philosophy behind ixEDEL and the 512M Open Stable finding that longer cycles preserve more value than frequent trading, which bleeds returns through fees, spreads, and slippage. Twice a year captures the counter-cyclical benefit without becoming a trading desk, and a published calendar gives institutional holders the predictability they want.

The off-cycle trigger stays: a 20% allocation drifting to roughly 35% justifies a proposal outside the scheduled dates. Proposals post thirty days ahead of each date. This first cycle is finalised close to July 5, so it runs on standard voting timing, with the thirty-day convention applying from January 2027.

New holding: USDY at 10%

Every stablecoin in the sleeve today is backed by DeFi yield engines: sUSDS by the Sky Savings Rate, steakUSDC by Morpho lending markets, syrupUSDC by Maple’s institutional loan book. The basket holds no direct exposure to US Treasury bills, the reference risk-free asset in dollars. USDY closes that gap.

USDY (0x96F6eF951840721AdBF46Ac996b59E0235CB985C) is Ondo’s tokenized note secured by short-term US Treasuries and bank demand deposits. It is an accumulating token whose price rises with the underlying yield, the same mechanic as svZCHF, and it is the rare Treasury-backed product with no transfer whitelist. Minting is KYC-gated and closed to US persons under Regulation S, with a 40 to 50 day lock on newly minted tokens, but secondary transfers are fully permissionless, which is why USDY circulates freely in DeFi. Liquidity on mainnet is deep: aggregator quotes fill a $1 million USDC-to-USDY swap with positive price improvement across multiple independent routes, so Reserve auction fillers can source it without any special integration. No protocol work is required on Reserve’s side, since Index DTFs use no price oracles or collateral plugins and can hold virtually any standard ERC-20. USDY is the accumulating token, not the rebasing rUSDY, which the Index Protocol explicitly does not support, so the contract address above is the only valid one for this basket.

The honest disclosures. USDY is issuer paper from Ondo USDY LLC, a secured note rather than a fund share, so holders rely on Ondo’s structuring and bankruptcy-remoteness arrangements alongside the Treasuries themselves. Ondo retains issuer controls, including a sanctions blocklist and the ability to pause transfers, standard for regulated RWA paper but a centralization point worth naming. And the Reg S restriction, while irrelevant to on-chain transfers, means US persons cannot mint or redeem it directly.

After the change the sleeve holds sUSDS 18%, USDY 10%, steakUSDC 8%, and syrupUSDC 4%, still 40% in total. The backing now spans four distinct engines: Sky at 18, US Treasuries at 10, Morpho credit at 8, Maple credit at 4. No single yield source exceeds 18% of the basket.

The July 2026 rebalance

The defensive legs held while Bitcoin and gold fell, leaving both growth legs underweight. The rebalance trims what held, funds the USDY addition, and buys what fell, back to fixed targets. Live weights are as of early July 2026. Actions are in percentage points.

Asset	Token	Live	Target	Action
Swiss franc	ZCHF → svZCHF*	24.76%	20%	Trim 4.76
USD yield	sUSDS	21.96%	18%	Trim 3.96
USD yield	steakUSDC	16.91%	8%	Trim 8.91
USD yield	syrupUSDC	5.83%	4%	Trim 1.83
USD yield	USDY	0%	10%	Buy 10.00
Gold	XAUT	17.86%	20%	Buy 2.14
Bitcoin	cbBTC	12.68%	20%	Buy 7.32

In net terms it trims 4.76 points of franc and 14.70 of existing stablecoins to fund 10.00 of USDY, 2.14 of gold, and 7.32 of Bitcoin. This is not a market call. It is mechanical restoration on a schedule, plus one backing-diversification swap inside the stablecoin sleeve.

* svZCHF substitution is conditional, see below. The franc slot is unchanged either way.

svZCHF yield upgrade

Plain ZCHF earns no yield, a drag on a fifth of the basket that contradicts the yield-bearing premise of the defensive sleeve. The Frankencoin Savings Vault, svZCHF, is a standard ERC-20 and ERC-4626 token that earns the savings rate while staying fully transferable. It takes the same 20% slot.

The mechanism is settled. svZCHF is atomically mintable through OpenOcean. The necessary work sits on Reserve’s side, registering svZCHF as collateral and routing acquisition through the OpenOcean mint path. That is development, not a governance switch.

We therefore ask the Reserve team to add that capability. If it ships before July 5, the franc slot migrates to svZCHF this cycle. If not, ZCHF holds for July and the swap executes once routing lands, either off-cycle or at the January 2027 rebalance.

Execution

The rebalance runs as standard Index DTF Dutch auctions. At current size they clear almost instantly with negligible slippage, so this cycle also serves as a low-risk rehearsal of the governance and auction process before it matters at higher TVL. Price ranges are set conservatively per liquidity tier at execution. The basket moves from six tokens to seven, and the earlier “nine tokens” reference in this thread is stale.

What is not changing

The four-bucket thesis and the 40/20/20/20 allocation are untouched, as are the fees and the governance surface of scheduled rebalances, asset-change criteria, the threshold trigger, and the DTF governor veto. No leverage, no exotic assets.

Feedback requested

Three asks. Reserve to confirm front-end and zap-mint support for USDY and to add svZCHF routing via OpenOcean to support the savings vault integration, and delegates to weigh in on the semi-annual cadence, the USDY addition, and the thirty-day notice.

This is a governance proposal, not investment advice.

[Mr_Bones]

I defintely agree on the semi-annual change to rebalancing. This will keep the weights more aligned with targets. The treasury backed token also seems beneficial and I think the benefits outweighs the risks. I think this proposal will be beneficial to the overall health of ixEDEL.

[0xd15co]

I am not a delegate on ixEDEL, but here are my two cents on this:

A semi-annual cadence makes sense, especially since the off-cycle trigger you mentioned remains in place. A 30-day window also seems reasonable. It gives plenty of time for discussion or to potentially veto a proposal before it goes onchain.

Regarding USDY: Ondo is a well-known and established player in this space, so the risk seems negligible and the liquidity is there as you mentioned.

[ham]

Thanks for the proposal.

While I’m not a delegate, broadly I’m very much for these type additions and amendments. USDY and svZCHF would be great additions not only to this DTF but the Reserve ecosystem more generally so support calls for the protocol team to include these assets.

I think it would be useful to drill down into some of the decisions you’ve made in this proposal.

• Why semi-annual? How does this perform Vs quarterly? A link to the report you reference might help here.

• Why a rough 15% positive tolerance (35% total) to trigger a rebalance? The ambiguity concerns me, can it not be more rigid? What happens if an asset contracts significantly instead? Can we have a tolerance to the downside as well? When considering tolerances it may be beneficial to consider them on the bucket level, i.e summing the USD collaterals. An initial threshold of +/- 10% looks to suitable for me, this can be tightened further if we’re triggering too many or not enough rebalances in between rebalance cycles.

[sagix.io]

@Mr_Bones @0xd15co @ham Thanks for the comments. These are the right questions, and working through them changed the proposal: our conclusion is to remove the off-cycle trigger entirely rather than tighten it. Reasoning below, point by point.

Why semi-annual rather than quarterly

The reference is 512M’s study of the Open Stablecoin Index rebalancing logic, which used to be here: https://512m.io/blog/open-stable-capturing-the-stablecoin-economy. perhaps @0xJMG has a copy of it somewhere and can share it.

In that article they backtested January 2021 through August 2025 and swept 30, 60, 90, and 180 day schedules against band settings. The 180 day cluster sat on the efficient edge, higher returns at similar volatility, and the grid search identified a clear best configuration at 180 days, with the 90, 60, and 30 day combinations all trailing. The 30 day schedules compressed lower with thicker left tails, which the authors attribute to over-trading and premature trimming of trends. Their practical summary was fewer forced sales and more trend capture.

An honest caveat: that study covers volatile DeFi governance tokens, not a defensive multi-asset basket, so the magnitudes will not transfer. I believe the mechanism does, and it matches what traditional research finds. Vanguard’s rebalancing work concluded there is no meaningful difference in risk-adjusted returns between monthly, quarterly, and annual rebalancing while costs rise with frequency, and there is further literature supporting a semi-annual cycle.

There is also an ixEDEL-specific reason. One way to read this DTF is that it uses the yield from the stablecoin and, hopefully soon, franc sleeves to buy Bitcoin and gold. Yield accrues continuously but only converts into the growth assets at rebalance, when those legs sit below target. On a 90 day cycle each purchase is funded by roughly 90 days of accrued yield. At 180 days the purchase is twice the size with half the auction overhead. For a basket whose job is patient accumulation, the longer cycle is the mechanism, not a compromise.

On the trigger bands

You asked for more rigidity, symmetry, and bucket-level measurement. Following that through took us somewhere simpler than a recalibrated band: the most rigid and least ambiguous rule available is the calendar itself, so we are removing the off-cycle trigger from the proposal. Two dates, fixed targets, nothing else. Three reasons.

First, the evidence that favors semi-annual over quarterly points the same direction on bands. In the 512M sweep the Sharpe surface improves as bands widen, and the tighter settings trail markedly.

Calendar rebalancing does not need to catch exact tops and bottoms. It only needs to harvest drift on average, and the evidence says it does.

Second, a mechanical trigger is the wrong tool for the case it appears designed for. Take your downside scenario seriously: if an asset contracts significantly because it is broken, a depegged stablecoin, a failed protocol, then a downside band would mandate buying more of it on a formula.

The falling-asset case needs judgment, not arithmetic, and DTF governance already holds the correct instrument, an asset-change proposal, available at any time with no pre-defined band required. Removing the trigger removes no capacity to act in an emergency. It removes the pretence that a formula can distinguish cheap from broken.

Third, the live evidence from this exact half-year. Bitcoin fell about 36% since ixedel launched. The largest bucket deviation that produced was 7.3 points. Nothing required action between the scheduled dates, and the calendar rebalance now executes the buy-low in one disciplined pass. If a 36% drawdown in the basket’s most volatile asset does not justify intervention, is the band based intervention really necessary?

Where you are right and it stays: bucket level is the correct lens for this basket. Each semi-annual proposal will report drift at bucket level, stablecoins, gold, franc, Bitcoin, so holders can see precisely what the calendar is correcting, as the July table in the proposal already does.

A concrete way to put the whole position: Bitcoin sits near $62,000 as I write this.

From here, $50,000 and $75,000 are both entirely possible outcomes, and we claim no edge on which comes first. The design does not ask us to have one. July buys a measured amount at these prices. If January arrives and Bitcoin is still cheap against its target, January buys a little more. If it has recovered, January trims instead. Averaging through the calendar replaces the pretence of timing, and it idoes not require being right about the exact bottom.

The proposal now is: threshold trigger removed, calendar-only rebalancing, ordinary governance for anything structural.

Thanks for the scrutiny, I believe it produced a cleaner design.

[ham]

Thanks for the follow-up.

I don’t think an asset always contracts because it is broken. BTC can be extremely volatile like you mention, does the ixEDEL mandate and methodology hold up if BTC prices halves in between semi-annual nodal points? Given then context of the 512M report, I don’t think we should plan to have triggers in between semi-annual cycles. KISS.

One thing that I think you could consider in order to strengthen this methodology is rebalance tolerances. For example, if set at +/- 2% and all the bucket allocations have deviated less than this, the deviation is tolerated and no rebalance at the semi-annual nodal point would be performed. This would further reduce the amount of rebalances required and limit governance fatigue but given you’re only planning 2 rebalances a year they may be redundant.

[sagix.io]

ok, I was trying to make the rebalance proposal with the USDY but the web app does not show USDY. Is there any way we can have it listed in the rebalance proposal form?