Summary
This proposal updates the eUSD Revenue Share Programme by moving from a 100/0 revenue split in favour of participating fintechs to a 90/10 split, with 10% of revenue generated on fintech-held balances redirected to eUSD RSR stakers.
The original 100% allocation played an important role in bootstrapping early distribution and market growth. As eUSD and its distribution partners have matured, however, no future transition framework was established in order to rebalance revenue towards a more equitable split, fairly compensating stakers for their ongoing work in governance and for over-collateralising the asset.
Under the proposed change, UC and Sentz each retain 90% of revenue generated on their respective eUSD balances, with the remaining 10% aggregated and distributed to eUSD stRSR. Based on the 26/02/2026 snapshot, this represents an annualised redistribution of approximately $31.6k to stRSR. Following the in-flight Revenue Share Programme update that reduces staking APY to 5.86%, the 90/10 adjustment partially offsets this decline, increasing staking APY to approximately 6.59%.
The proposal is intentionally minimal in scope. It does not alter the biweekly update cadence, distribution mechanics or operational processes. Instead, it establishes a clearer long-term revenue framework that better aligns incentives across fintech partners and RSR stakers while preserving revenue predictability and ecosystem stability.
Problem Statement
eUSD was the first DTF to go live on the Reserve Protocol, remains the second largest by supply and has more RSR staked on it than any other DTF. As the only dollar-pegged DTF and the primary vehicle for fintech distribution, it remains a core lever for both ecosystem TVL expansion and broader growth.
The original decision to allocate 100% of revenue generated on fintech-held balances to participating fintechs was made during early-stage bootstrapping. At that time, prioritising distribution and market cap growth was appropriate and widely supported. However, no transition framework or review mechanism was defined to govern how this revenue split should evolve as eUSD and participating fintechs matured.
Today, fintech participants continue to collect 100% of revenue generated on their balances, while RSR stakers provide governance and over-collateralisation without participating in that revenue stream. The absence of a defined long-term revenue framework has resulted in a structurally imbalanced model.
Rationale
Redirecting 10% of revenue generated on fintech-held balances to eUSD stRSR provides a proportionate correction to the incentive imbalance identified above. It preserves the majority of fintech revenue while introducing a revenue stream for the stakers that governs and over-collateralise eUSD.
Under the proposed 90/10 split, UC and Sentz each retain 90% of revenue generated on their respective balances. Based on the 26/02/2026 snapshot, this results in annualised revenue reductions of approximately $28.7k and $2.8k respectively, while redirecting approximately $31.6k to stRSR.
This redistribution towards stRSR partially offsets the in-flight reduction in staking APY, increasing staking yield from 5.86% to approximately 6.59%.
The proposed split represents a minimal and predictable intervention. It avoids introducing new DTF variants without over-collateralisation, which would fragment liquidity and weaken product clarity, and avoids higher protocol fee structures that would significantly impair fintech economics. Instead, the 90/10 structure better aligns distribution growth with governance capital, without altering programme cadence or introducing structural complexity.
Onchain Change
If approved, the revenue share contract will be updated to reflect the allocation percentages shown below. UC and Sentz will each receive 90% of revenue generated on their respective eUSD balances, with the remaining 10% aggregated and distributed to eUSD stRSR. This replaces the current 100/0 structure, resulting in the revised on-chain percentage distribution outlined in Table 3. No other programme mechanics or distribution cadence are altered by this change.
The removal of the revenue share to the eUSD champion is discussed in the eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 26-02-2026.
The data and formulas used to generate the tables above can be inspected here.
Timeline
This proposal does not interrupt or modify the existing biweekly cadence of the eUSD Revenue Share Programme updates. If approved, the revised revenue split will be applied using the most recent balance snapshot taken on 26/02/2026, ensuring continuity with the current framework.
Future Revenue Share Programme updates will continue as scheduled, with the next balances snapshot expected on 12/03/2026. No changes are proposed to snapshot frequency, reporting timelines or operational processes beyond the adjustment to the revenue share split itself.
Risks
The primary risk associated with this proposal is a potential negative response from participating fintechs to a reduction in headline revenue. While the absolute impact illustrated in Table 1 is modest, particularly relative to total programme revenue, given the razor thin margins usually associated with a fintech’s core business, some fintech partners may view any reduction as a precedent for future intervention. This risk is mitigated by the simplicity and predictability of the proposed change, with a flat 90/10 split that avoids ongoing adjustments or discretionary intervention. This risk is further mitigated by the fact that participating fintech partners have publicly expressed support for the proposed 90/10 structure.
There is also a risk that reallocating revenue could marginally slow future fintech-led distribution of eUSD and other DTFs if the revenue stream from the eUSD Revenue Share Programme drops. However, given that fintechs still retain 90% of revenue with this proposal the reduction is unlikely to affect distribution significantly with the shortfall being made up elsewhere.
Finally, the incremental increase in staking APY is dependent on current balances and staking participation remaining broadly stable. Should fintech-held balances or the total amount of RSR staked change, the realised APY uplift may differ from the figures presented. This does not introduce additional protocol risk but should be understood as a function of adoption dynamics rather than a guaranteed return.
Overall, these risks are considered manageable and proportionate, particularly when weighed against the benefits of improved incentive alignment, clearer long-term expectations for revenue sharing and reduced reliance on more disruptive alternatives.
Poll
- YAY, for the revenue share adjustment
- NAY, against the revenue share adjustment