This report provides an overview of relevant metrics surrounding Electronic Dollar (eUSD) in Q1 of 2025. Taking a look at the governance performance both on the forums and onchain, TVL and other important DeFi metrics, and social media data. The goal being to keep everyone in the community up to date on all things eUSD.
Market Cap and TVL:
Summary: This section looks at the total market cap of eUSD and how it’s split across different networks and accounted for in the Reserve Yield Protocol.
eUSD Total Market Cap: $24.1 Million previous $22.4 Million
eUSD Market Cap Breakdown - https://defillama.com/stablecoin/electronic-usd
Ethereum: $15.26 Million previous $12.54 Million
Base: $7.71 Million previous $8.87 Million
Arbitrum: $1.17 Million previous $1.06 Million
Staked RSR: 2.75 Billion RSR staked previous 3.1 Billion
eUSD’s Total TVL in the Reserve Protocol(Market cap + Staked RSR): $41.2 Million previous $57.2 Million
Governance:
Summary: This section looks at all the governance proposals both onchain and on the forums.
Forum Proposals:
- Fintech RevShare proposals:
Outcome: Each proposal was brought onchain.
- [RFC] Addendum to eUSD RevShare with Fintechs(Doubling the Fintechs Revenue)
Outcome: This was not brought onchain, addendum was rejected and original Fintech RevShare proposal will continue
- [RFC] Change in eUSD Revenue Share operational parameters
Outcome: The FinTech RevShare update proposals happen bi-weekly. The increase in frequency no longer requires this subset of rules.
- [IP] eUSD Collateral Basket Change Proposal 4
Outcome: This proposal will happen in two steps. Step one—removing sDAI from the basket—is complete. Step two: awaits the development and audit of the Aave V3 USDT plugin.
Onchain Proposals:
- Fintech RevShare proposals:
Outcome: Two proposals met quorum, one did not. Steps have been taken to mitigate not reaching quorum.
- [IP] eUSD Collateral Basket Change Proposal 4: Step 1
Outcome: Passed and executed
DeFi and Onchain Metrics
Transactions on Each Network:
eUSD transactions on Ethereum - 30,772 previous 9000
eUSD transactions on Base - 64,142 previous 75,890
eUSD transactions on Arbitrum - 2,554 previous 12,538
Integrations
Summary: This section looks at the TVL of eUSD in all the different protocols.
Morpho
Gauntlet eUSD Core vault on Ethereum
- Deposits: $8.75M previous $5.37M
- Number Holders: 62 previous 33
Morpho eUSD vault on Base
- Deposits: $7.61M previous $5.64M
- Number Holders: 363 previous 344
Curve
Curve Pools on Ethereum:
TriRSR:
Total Pool TVL: $3.8M previous $6.3M
ETH+: 673 previous 558
RSR: 177M previous 143M
eUSD: $1.2M previous $1.8M
eUSD/USDC:
Total Pool TVL: $7.5M previous $6.2M
eUSD: $3.9M previous $3.1M
USDC: $3.6M previous $3.0M
eUSD+FRAX/USDC (FRAXBP):
Total Pool TVL: $692K previous $236K
eUSD: $300K previous $87K
USDC: $109K previous $19K
FRAX: 200K previous $130K
Curve Pools on Arbitrum:
eUSD/USDC:
Total Pool TVL: $1.05M previous $692K
eUSD: $709K previous $454K
USDC: $344K previous $239K
KNOX/eUSD:
Total Pool TVL: $703K previous $692K
KNOX: $267K previous $360K
eUSD: $425K previous $569K
Aerodrome:
Aerodrome Pools on Base:
Concentrated Stable USDC/eUSD:
Total Pool TVL: $1.8M previous $4.1M
eUSD: $891K previous $1.4M
USDC: $976K previous $2.6M
Basic Stable USDC/eUSD:
Total Pool TVL: $2.01M previous $3.3M
eUSD: $1.1M previous $1.7M
USDC: $898K previous $1.6M
Basic Volatile hyUSD/eUSD:
Total Pool TVL: $3.6M previous $5.5M
hyUSD: $1.6M previous $2.5M
eUSD: $1.8M previous $2.7M
Fintech Revenue Share
Summary: In this section we look at what the FinTech Revenue Share percentage is of eUSD and what the projected yearly income is.
Ugly Cash:
RevShare Percentage: 5.6%
eUSD Holdings: $1.65 Million
Sentz:
RevShare Percentage: 4.4%
eUSD Holdings: $1.09 Million
Social Media
Summary: In this section we look at the surrounding data and important metrics from the eUSD X account.
X Followers: 456 previous 343
X Impressions: 92k previous 50k
X Engagement Rate: 4.1% previous 2.4%
Conclusion:
In this quarter, we observed a slight but steady increase in most metrics for eUSD. This growth can be attributed to eUSD’s expansion in DeFi through incentives and the ongoing FinTech Rev Share proposals. Additionally, the overcollateralization percentage of eUSD at one point had surpassed 200%. It has since declined and is now sitting at around 80%. This larger buffer sparked a discussion: Is eUSD’s overcollateralization overfunded? If so, could that revenue be better utilized to increase eUSD’s market cap? To explore strong ideas, I conducted this research under two assumptions: 1) 100% of the revenue was available for use, and 2) Governors would fully support any proposal. While these conditions are unrealistic, they opened the door to creative scenarios. Overcollateralization remains critical and should be maintained, and not every governance proposal will garner full support. Nevertheless, here are three ideas I developed.
Idea 1: Send 15% of the revenue(from the RSR stakers) to incentivize the eUSD/USDC pool on Curve. This proposal involves sending 15% of the revenue from RSR stakers to incentivize the eUSD/USDC pool on Curve. The goal is to attract yield farmers to mint eUSD and provide liquidity to the pool. If successful, this would achieve two objectives: 1) Grow the eUSD market cap, and 2) Deepen on-chain liquidity for eUSD, enabling larger swaps. This concept originated from Braden of Sovereign Stack (see the original proposal here). While specific calculations are omitted, the conclusion was that this approach would indeed increase the MC and on-chain liquidity—up to a ceiling. At that point, the 15% revenue would be needed to maintain the pool’s size and growth. If the revenue were then returned to RSR stakers, the MC and liquidity would likely revert to their starting levels. Sustained growth would require stakers to commit additional revenue everytime the ceiling was reached. Mechanically, the revenue would be sent as eUSD to a multisig controlled by trusted parties, who would manually distribute incentives to the pool, similar to how rgUSD operated.
Idea 2: Send X% of the revenue(from the RSR stakers) to a multisig that would LP those funds in the eUSD/USDC pool. Given the ceiling in Idea 1, I explored an alternative without such a limit. This idea involves sending X% of RSR staker revenue to a multisig, which would then provide liquidity to the eUSD/USDC pool on Curve. This would grow the eUSD MC, deepen on-chain liquidity, and avoid a growth cap. However, stakers would need to wait several years—depending on the revenue allocated—for the MC to grow enough to yield a return on their sacrificed revenue. Mechanically, the revenue would be sent as eUSD to a multisig controlled by trusted parties, who would then LP the funds in the pool.
Idea 3: Doubling the FinTech RevShare. Currently, per the initial Rev Share proposal, the percentage is based on the amount of eUSD held by FinTech apps relative to the eUSD market cap. This idea proposes doubling that ratio (i.e., eUSD held by FinTechs relative to MC × 2). The proposal reached the forums (see feedback here), and I met with FinTechs to gauge their needs. In short, Sentz supported the change, while UglyCash was satisfied with the existing Rev Share proposal. With mixed support, advancing this idea proved challenging, and the original RevShare program remains in place. Exciting FinTech developments are underway, but more details will follow at a later date.
Two eUSD DeFi integrations stand out: the Gauntlet eUSD Core Vault on Morpho and the eUSD/USDC pool on Curve. The Morpho vault offers approximately 9% APY, potentially driving user growth and TVL since last quarter. Its “looping-friendly” collateral may also encourage users to leverage their positions, further boosting growth. Meanwhile, the incentivized eUSD/USDC Curve pool has maintained an APY of 5% or higher throughout the quarter, likely contributing to increased TVL.
Most governance proposals this quarter focused on FinTech Rev Share updates, which occur bi-weekly to more accurately align on-chain percentages with FinTech eUSD holdings. This manual process has drawn questions about why a third party must handle it. Technical limitations prevent automation (even if governance supported it), notably the protocol’s inability to detect mints and redeems. The other significant proposal this quarter was an update to the collateral basket. This will happen in two steps. Step one—removing sDAI from the basket—is complete. Step two awaits the development and audit of the Aave V3 USDT plugin. Gabo noted in the comments that removing sDAI could enhance eUSD’s regulatory clarity. More to come on this topic, there are some really interesting developments taking place behind the scenes.
Our X presence has seen dramatic growth across all metrics: engagement rate, followers, and impressions. Next quarter, we aim to sustain follower and impression growth while maintaining the high engagement rate—a positive sign of community interest. This account appears to be fostering a sub-community within the Reserve Ecosystem, likely composed of RSR stakers, Ugly Cash enthusiasts, and eUSD yieldoors.
Disclaimer: This is everything that happened this quarter, a celebration of the community and an invitation to participate in the ongoing success of eUSD. Continue to participate in the gov ops calls, continue to participate on the forums and in onchain votes.
eUSD: created on the Reserve Yield Protocol 
