1. Summary of the Original Post (0xJMG)
The original post, titled “[RFC] RSR Health: Request For Comments,” argues that the Reserve Rights ($RSR) token is structurally unhealthy due to two core, interlinked problems:
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Metric Distortion from Excess Supply: An estimated 30 billion unused RSR tokens and at least 41% of the total supply held in company-controlled wallets inflate the Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV). This makes the token appear overvalued based on key efficiency ratios like TVL-to-FDV, deterring external capital and talent who often filter opportunities based on headline FDV.
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Concentrated Ownership and Opaque Governance: The centralization of control and capital decisions in company wallets fosters disengagement among other RSR holders, who feel their votes are neutered. This “trust-based” system lacks the verifiable transparency required to attract serious builders and institutions, resulting in low participation and a failure to compound human capital.
The proposal advocates for a structural reform to modernize RSR’s monetary logic:
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Introduce a veRSR-governed tail-emission model: Replace the fixed-supply cap with a flexible, community-controlled schedule to align incentives and provide long-term, predictable funding for growth.
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Proposed burn of ~30B $RSR: Remove unused tokens to improve valuation optics and signal credible scarcity.
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Mandate full transparency: Disclose all treasury data and require community governance (veRSR) over major funding and emission decisions.
2. Summaries of Key Replies (selected by StableLab)
| Post | Contributor | Main Points and Suggestions |
|---|---|---|
| #17 | Ranger198P | Expressed full support, stating the proposal is “a bit overdue.” |
| #25 | 0xd15co | Generally supportive but raises critical questions: clarify if tail emissions mean allowing new minting; notes veRSR may not solve governance centralization if core entities simply lock their tokens; and warns against veRSR offering higher, less risky rewards than staked RSR (which provides DTF collateral). |
| #28 | PostAurum | Agrees the Bitcoin-like emission model is rigid. Suggests converting the 30B burn into a metric-driven, gradual process tied to Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) like TVL-to-supply ratio or governance participation, to anchor scarcity in verifiable growth rather than being a one-off event. |
| #29 | r2g | Provides a detailed, referenced economic argument (using stock buyback parallels) in full support of burning the excess supply, arguing it removes the “deferred dilution” overhang, increases per-share value, and makes the remaining treasury holdings more valuable when deployed later. |
| #31 | Mr_Bones | Supports the KPI-gated burn/escrow approach as a “social contract” binding both the Reserve team and holders to necessary behavioral changes. Suggests the team must take the first steps to reduce centralized wallet influence as a sign of good faith. |
| #32 | nagaking | Expresses skepticism about an infinite/undefined emissions approach, arguing it makes FDV too ambiguous. Emphasizes the need for serious financial modeling and cautions against confusing RSR-specific issues with general crypto market underperformance. |
| #35 | Mallo | Agrees the BTC emission pattern is inappropriate for RSR. Supports the 30B burn if the tokens cannot be objectively spent on ecosystem growth in the near term, calling them a “white elephant.” |
| #39 | DollarQuestion | Believes a major shift in power dynamics might be premature, advocating instead for detailed transparency on how treasury RSR is allocated (e.g., liquidity, growth, partnerships) and a hardcoded token use plan, as a better way to shift negative sentiment than a massive burn. |
| #44 | Haskel | Proposes the creation of a Deferred Burn Vault (DBV) to hold the 30B supply, with tokens only burned automatically upon reaching measurable KPIs, and a Dynamic Burn Corridor (DBC) to set the guaranteed minimum and maximum burn commitment. This structure provides hard commitment with necessary flexibility. |
| #47 | sonnyjune | Calls the burn critical to signal seriousness and attract staying investors. Argues that RSR management has been strategically poor and that a successful tokenomics fix will boost RSR price, making the current large retained supply unnecessary anyway. Advocates for urgency and an immediate 30B burn. |
| #50 | Haskel | Rebuts the idea of accelerating burns when growth stalls, arguing this “removes oxygen from the system,” limits runway, and risks triggering a dangerous negative feedback loop. Reaffirms that burns must scale with real strength and performance (the DBC model). |
| #57 | 0xJMG (Author) | Defines RSR Health (system function/leading indicator) as separate from RSR Price (market outcome/lagging indicator). Reiterates the proposal goals and, for governance, suggests a pilot of community-elected, paid delegates (given temporary RSR voting power from company wallets) to boost participation. |
| #59 | Rsr0x | Proposes immediate decentralization via a targeted airdrop of team-held RSR to long-term holders (e.g., since 2019) to shift power to the most committed. Also demands an immediate burn of all unused supply and full runway transparency. |
| #63 | nevin.freeman (Core Team) | Core Team Stance. States that product-market fit (fees from DTFs) is the ultimate success factor. Asks the community to wait until ABC Labs’ major growth initiative is public for a more informed discussion. Corrects the misunderstanding that a 20B RSR treasury is currently liquid. Reaffirms that the original author (0xJMG) does not expect a price increase from the burn. |
| #74 | 0xJMG (Author) | Expresses concern that viewing Reserve’s edge only as “DTF distribution” (as Nevin suggested) marginalizes RSR and its community, which he argues should be the central coordination layer. Challenges the core team to define Reserve’s true competitive edge amid growing competition. |
| #77 | Haskel | Provides detailed “asterisks and caveats” to Nevin, noting that sophisticated capital avoids RSR because the supply/unlock mechanism requires “trusting a third party,” which is a non-starter. Argues the Bitcoin analogy fails because RSR lacks Bitcoin’s trustlessness and decentralized distribution. |
| #78 | Flamingo_Mafia | States that the protocol (DTFs) is disconnected from the token (RSR). Suggests creating an “RSR 2.0” summary to reset perception with clear, simple goals. Proposes tracking the Average Unique Voters per DTF proposal as the key metric for governance health. |
| #80 | Rsr0x | Offers an extremely direct critique, arguing the “no hype, fundamentals only” strategy has been a “death sentence” and led to RSR being a “forgotten project.” Stresses that crypto success requires attention, narrative, and momentum and that the community is “begging for a 30 BILLION burn just to bring back a heartbeat.” |
| #91 | nevin.freeman (Core Team) | Acknowledges the opaqueness of treasury usage. Discloses that Confusion Capital was a net buyer of RSR in 2024 and 2025, meaning price stagnation was due to lack of demand, not team dumping. Strongly opposes any hard fork that eliminates the 100B hard supply cap, viewing it as breaking a “sacred promise,” meaning any burn must be permanent. Proposes engaging RSR holders as community marketers to gather feedback by personally introducing DTFs to friends/family. |
| #94 | 0xJMG (Author) | Reasserts that stronger community ownership is the most important issue (citing Thiel: “Without a stake in the system, they turn against it”). Suggests a hard fork/rebrand, though messy, could be an “energizing storyline” and marketing opportunity. Rejects the idea that a speculative boom would fix fundamental health issues. |
| #97 | truedivine | Argues the core issue is structural, stating Confusion Capital functions as the de facto central bank based on “continued benevolence.” Demands hard guarantees to restore confidence: hard-coded emissions, on-chain treasury rules, explicit constraints on unlocked supply use, and governance decentralization through caps. |
| #98 | Teeb | Demands the immediate burn of 30-40B tokens to create “trust” and a “succeed at all costs” culture. Criticizes the idea of using the community as a “salesforce” for DTFs, suggesting it signals a failure to achieve institutional adoption. Expresses doubt about Reserve’s fiduciary responsibility. |
| #99 | Fernando | Expresses deep belief and long-term commitment but frustration that innovative tech is not reflected in price. Argues current investors feel like liquidity providers for the company’s engine without a return, and suggests Reserve needs a “big player” to create the necessary cult/momentum. |
| #100 | SageDeacon | Argues that growth will come from demand, not supply tweaks, as structural scarcity is already improving. Advocates the team shift focus to Developer Toolkits, Institutional Partnerships, and visible wins over continued tokenomics debate. Asks the core team for its top 3 ecosystem-growth priorities for the next 90 days. |
| #101 | WIWC | A long-term holder who is now fatigued and asks the core team directly: “Do you want people to buy RSR or not?” Criticizes the lack of simple, jargon-free marketing and the confusion over RSR’s value proposition relative to DTFs. |
| #102 | alexm | An investor who sees DTFs as vital but notes the complexity. Suggests creating a simple, awesome, and professional website and app that allows regular people to easily purchase an Official Reserve DTF as the default option, contrasting it with the current advanced-user site. |
| #112 | 0xJMG (Author) | Shares a detailed comparison matrix of competitor approaches (Bitcoin, Circle, Aave, Alchemix) for “ownership” in three stages: Transparency, Open Collaboration, and Governance. Argues Reserve must upgrade its cultural commitment to ownership. |
| #116 | Smeddy | Notes the narrative problem: 60M RSR burned vs. 6BN unlocked creates difficulty in selling to friends/family. Proposes a “beneficial dictator” solution: a time-locked “Nevin’s account” of 30BN RSR with a 1BN yearly release, where Nevin/team decides each year whether to burn or allocate. |
| #120 | ham | Argues RSR holders are becoming peripheral to the protocol’s growth. Detailed critique of specific flaws: unilateral reduction of platform shares on CMC20, eUSD governance issues, and siloed DTF governance. Proposes Unification of siloed index DTF governance (veRSR model for index DTFs) and a Delegate Education/Incentive Programme. |
3. Summary of the Entire Discussion
The discussion revealed a community consensus on the urgent need to address three key structural problems: massive supply overhang, centralized treasury control, and governance issues of perceived concentrated team voting power. This combination has created a crisis of perception and ownership that seems to deter external capital and exhaust long-term holders.
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The Problem is Structural, not just price-based: Contributors widely agreed that RSR’s low price and lack of momentum are symptoms of structural flaws. The Bitcoin emission curve analogy is perceived as not fully developed, because RSR lacks Bitcoin’s fully encoded and automatic distribution and trustlessness, forcing investors (especially institutional ones) to rely on the core team’s “continued benevolence.”
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The Core Team’s Position (as argued by Nevin): The core team acknowledged the transparency issues and the mistake of not hard-coding the emissions contract sooner. They disclosed that the treasury was a net buyer of RSR in 2024/2025, clarifying that the price decline was due to lack of demand growth, not team dumping. The team’s priority is Product-Market Fit (PMF) for DTFs, viewing RSR as “lighter fluid” to start the growth fire, and asked the community to wait for a major growth initiative launch. Crucially, the team strongly opposes any proposal that eliminates the 100 billion hard supply cap.
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Burn Debate:
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One side demands a massive burn (30–40B) to restore price optics. And see a burn as a signal of commitment, and a way to create a “succeed at all costs” culture.
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The opposing view (including modified proposals by Haskel/PostAurum) favors a KPI-gated or phased burn that makes deflation conditional on measurable protocol performance (like TVL or governance activity). This would ensure the burn is sustainable and doesn’t exhaust the project’s long-term runway.
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Governance Debate: The community coalesces around hard guarantees and structural constraints (veRSR, on-chain treasury rules, and caps on team voting power). The team suggested a willingness to make incremental steps, such as delegating company RSR voting power to community members and prioritizing community help with grassroots DTF distribution to achieve PMF. This was met with criticism that community marketing is premature when the product and token fundamentals are unclear.
4. Matrix of Opinions on the Topic
| Theme | Structural Reform / Ownership Focus (0xJMG, truedivine, Rsr0x, Flamingo_Mafia) | KPI-Gated / Demand Growth Focus (Haskel, PostAurum, SageDeacon, ham) | Core Team Strategy / PMF Priority (nevin.freeman) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excess Supply / Burn | Immediate Burn (of ~$30-40B) to eliminate toxic FDV optics, signal seriousness, and to increase market credibility. Price action and momentum are necessary for survival. | Conditional/Gradual Burn tied to KPIs (TVL, fees, participation) to ensure burns reward growth and conserve runway during downturns. | Oppose hard cap removal. Any burn must be permanent (retaining 100B max supply). Price decline is due to low demand, not treasury sales (CC was a net buyer). |
| Governance / Control | Governance is perceived as centralized. Demands radical change: veRSR, airdrops to long-term holders, hard caps/constraints on team voting power, and transparent, on-chain treasury rules. | Propose a Delegate Education/Incentive Programme and unification of DTF governance (veRSR for index DTFs) to increase quality participation and delegate team voting power. | Acknowledging centralized voting is a problem. Open to delegating team votes to community members. PMF for DTFs is the focus; decentralization follows. |
| Emissions Model | Fixed cap is impractical; need an adaptable tail-emissions model (veRSR) to fund indefinite growth. Bitcoin analogy falls short due to lack of trustlessness. | Need a hard-coded, rule-based emissions schedule that is transparent and non-discretionary. Focus energy on Developer Toolkits, Integrations, and Marketing. | Reject moving away from the 100B hard cap (“sacred promise”). Mistake was in not hard-coding the current curve sooner and improving communication. |
| Primary Project Focus | RSR Health/Ownership is the necessary precursor to successful PMF. The token needs immediate structural fixes to attract patient institutional capital. | Focus on Growth through demand (integrations, builder tools, partnerships). Tokenomics tweaks distract from ecosystem activation. Suggests team publish top 3 growth priorities. | Product-Market Fit (DTF Growth) is the number one priority. RSR is the “lighter fluid” to grow the fire. Encourages community to help with grassroots DTF distribution. |
Please be aware that the selection of replies incurs a subjective bias. Google Gemini was used to generate summaries, with the overall summary done by @rspa_StableLab.
If you feel there are errors here that need to be addressed please let me know.