01-15-26 Community Call recap + discussion

Thank you to everyone who showed up for yesterday’s community call. A full recording of the call is available here and embedded below.

It was a dense one… nearly two hours covering three major topics (ish):

  1. DTF product-market fit: the main priority for 2026, including how we’re thinking about which DTFs to launch and why
  2. RSR economics and emissions: 2025 numbers, the decision to pause unlocking, and ideas being explored for the path forward
  3. UglyCash: how it connects to Reserve, the BFF partnership agreement, and growth metrics

Catch up:

Community call recording:

  • 00:00 – Intro
  • 07:30 – 2024–25 recap: Index Protocol development timeline
  • 14:24 – Leadership transition: Thomas → Nevin as ABC Labs CEO
  • 18:15 – Project status: solid/mid/tenuous framework + analysis
  • 31:34 – 2026 focus: finding DTF product-market fit
  • 45:00 – Go-to-market strategy + DTF idea pipeline
  • 59:00 – RSR economics: 2025 numbers + treasury operations
  • 1:04:51 – RSR unlocking paused + milestone-based model ideas
  • 1:14:00 – BFF/UglyCash partnership agreement explained
  • 1:20:25 – UglyCash update: growth metrics and path forward

If you have thoughts on anything covered in the call, drop them below. For RSR emissions specifically, the discussion continues in the RSR Health thread; @nevin.freeman is also planning video calls for higher-bandwidth conversation on that topic.

Have a DTF idea? Submit it here

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On the Jan 23 call (2nd call in Jan) between ABC Labs and the community, roughly 20-30 participants joined the discussion.

Everyone in the room agreed on one thing: trust in the RSR community is clearly strained.

Nevin echoed an idea he has raised on the forums and the call: milestone-based unlocks.

But without clarity on immutability and complementary mechanisms to milestone unlocks in a more detailed proposal, this is difficult to evaluate. It may introduce significant administrative overhead for a problem that simpler, more effective approaches can address.

In response, the DRF compiled a set of pragmatic trust quick and longer-term win suggestions. The list below is an open invitation to brainstorm, critique, and extend.

QUICK WINS SUGGESTIONS: by April 2, 2026:

  • Monthly ABC Labs update posts covering wins, challenges, details, and community asks.
  • Monthly community Q&A calls, with two or more ABC Labs attendees. DRF can host.
  • Quarterly financial report from ABC Labs on treasury, revenue, emissions, spend. (Aave and Alchemix examples)
  • DTF technical or governance question on the Discord, Forums or Telegram answered by ABC Labs within 48 hours, to compound momentum.
  • Community-elected delegate program. A few possible ideas…
    • Five delegates, each delegated ~75M RSR from ABC / CC.
    • Delegates elected or renewed every six months via stRSR or vlRSR Snapshot. Quality and minimum participation rate required, that the community will decide. Delegates make a forum post summarizing contributions prior to Snapshot vote.
    • Each delegate receives a $____ six-month stipend as acknowledgment.

LONGER WINS SUGGESTIONS: by Jun 1, 2026

  • ABC Labs semiannual After Action Review (AAR) blog post + community call to action.
  • ABC Labs consider to approve, reject or suggest alternatives:
    • Multi-year RSR locking for higher rewards, e.g. goal of 30% locked for 3+ years (e.g. FXN, AERO, CRV).
    • Community governance over the RSR emissions rate.
    • Community governance over annual spend line items exceeding $500,000.
    • DTF “tell-a-friend” referral system with rewards attribution to participating stRSR or veRSR holders.
    • RSR tokenomics and utility refresh
    • Clarification on ‘protocol fees’. A set fee structure was included in the docs until CMC20 negotiated hard and brought protocol fees down from 50% to ~33%. Fees currently equal burn, lack of clarity on fee structure affects RSR health and ecosystem and pricing models.
  • Reiterate: this is decisive clarity on a refine/approve/reject, not implementation. Lack of clarity creates resistance to come together and promote.

We think increasing trust helps, not hurts, the pursuit of PMF.
If anyone has better ideas, or would like to critique these suggestions, please do share in the comments.

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This post is my review of the Jan 15 Reserve community call and subsequent discourse. What follows is some thinking on possible outcomes, observations and concerns for readers to use (or challenge) as they see fit.

Decentralization debates often stall progress by circling a buzzword instead of the underlying mechanics, benefits and 2nd order effects, and we’ll unpack this a little in this post.

Starting with the obvious, the “D” in DTFs seems core to the Reserve product and brand, not really optional window dressing. A marketer might even argue this principle anchors the product’s credible neutrality, and something CeFi products cannot offer.

The D in DTFs

The “D” promise was fractured with eUSD in 2025. Governance had shifted to ~26 eUSD revenue-share rebalances a year with flawed evidence of better outcomes. Revenue share decreased for RSR stakers supplying overcollateralization, while attention drifted from the more important brand building and fintech partnership growing mandate. The work increased, but the value did not.

Mallo flagged (inadvertently, I think) a dynamic where company-linked wallets drowned out eUSD independent governors. This got me curious and I zoomed out, collated community signals on governance fatigue and summarized again, and later analyzed a full year of eUSD data and found a surprise. 26 rebalances actually paid less revenue to UglyCash than 12 or even 4 per year, which could have cut governance load 50–80%. Despite this, eUSD rolled on unchanged, beyond community influence. So unsurprisingly, they disengaged.

RSR Health and PMF are one in the same

This opened the door to naming a deeper problem, RSR health, and more recently pulling Reserve’s product market fit aspirations into focus.

Turns out, one can help (or hurt) the other.

RSR funds the project and nominally governs DTFs, but it’s not a part of a compounding growth loop and trust has fractured.

The implication is we have two different products, DTFs and RSR.

Getting PMF once is difficult. Twice is near impossible. Two weakly linked loops create distraction, but in the RSR health current state, it’s worse and creating counter forces.

The irony is, RSR can be a powerful part of the solution.

SaaS entrepreneur Hiten Shah shared a crisp insight thats often overlooked about PMF.

"A product without distribution is like a secret. And most secrets never get out.

When founders talk about product/market fit, they often forget the middle part. The part where people actually have to find the thing. Try it. Tell someone else. Come back. And not just because the product is useful, but because they believe in it.

The truth is, most products don’t spread on their own. People spread them.

That means someone has to push. Someone has to tell the story in a way that makes other people want to be part of it."

That someone could be the many thousands of RSR holders along with the team, but only if incentives are aligned.

Growth loops

“Growth loops” or “core loops” are popular VC/founder jargon for products with mechanisms that enable spreading naturally, either with no or reduced marketing spend. Facebook, Linkedin, Uber among many others exist today thanks to their growth loops.

One of the most well articulated growth loops in crypto I’ve found is Aerodrome. All value flows onchain are integrated in a loop.

Customer behaviors, strategy changes, or side quests fit within the loop and the community and token are integrated throughout. The Aerodrome DEX cannot function without AERO in multiple utility touchpoints. Multiple is the keyword. These touchpoints compound.

I think Reserve’s correct path could be an RSR-powered DTF growth loop with a built-in viral coefficient. Admittedly, this is really easy to say and very difficult to do, yet I think that’s what we are here for. I’ll share more specific ideas on this soon but in a separate thread.

For anyone wanting to dive deeper on growth loops, study Sarah Tavel’s hierarchy of engagement and a16z’s Andrew Chen, to start.

Back to longevity

Some combination of RSR metrics legibility improvement, recommended trust wins, and ownership through transparency or mechanisms reset can improve optics, reinvigorate community as capital and while still preserving the runway needed to cross the PMF chasm.

We might be able to prove that the market wants RSR-powered DTFs that can launch faster, safer, cheaper and more credibly neutral than alternatives. Faster because the infrastructure already exists. Safer because it is open source and battle tested. Cheaper because the RSR community already paid the upfront cost. Credible neutrality comes from the D in DTFs, in theory.

Regardless of what we prove and when we prove it, a healthy RSR community stacks the odds in our favor. As structurally aligned owners “in this together”, we improve our chances to get there faster.

Below I thought it helpful to provide some specific feedback on things in the call. Hope you find it useful.

Jan 15 community call: things to like

  1. Core team are talking more about RSR. Progress.
  2. 2024-25 recap timeline helpful. Share more of those before, during and after. More co owners = more help to achieve.
  3. Good idea: “More public communications like this”
  4. Honest recognition of structural issues on Thomas vs Nevin role. Actually already happening much sooner. Evident in early '24. Anyways, onward and upward.
  5. “Own your share of the world’s wealth” is really good in 7 words or less. Explains the user benefit, creates belonging. Well done. But is it referring to RSR-powered DTFs, or DTFs in general even though each DTF should have its own specific identity? Maybe the “what/when/how” will clarify this.
  6. Labeled and quantified definition of Reserve PMF ~goals. Nicely articulated. Creates a helpful shared-lens from which to question all ideas and initiatives.
  7. BFF Ugly Cash sharing labeled and quantified progress in updates and forums over last few months, with a lens on eUSD, RSR, and DTFs. Lights on for the community - thank you.
  8. “RSR unlocking tied to predetermined milestones” is interesting to explore. MetaDAO is running this model for projects launching in their ecosystem. Worth a study.
  9. Investment ROI questions aside (see below), BFF/UglyCash distribution deal “50% of customer assets are Reserve assets” is helpful visibility.

Jan 15 community call: things to further address

  1. No actions yet to improve RSR utility and desirability. No indication that RSR can be an accelerant to DTF adoption, rather than just an exit-liquidity token.
  2. “Decentralization won’t sacrifice motion on PMF.” Agree, but consider how it will help PMF. Wartime requires an army.
  3. In the Reserve ecosystem, staking is about 4-5% locked for 14 days. There are several ecosystems like Frax, Curve, Fx with 30-60% locked for 1 to 3 years. The virtuous or viscous circle is in the math, incentives lead the outcomes for compounding or disintegrating value.
  4. Ideas to keep an eye on for improving RSR utility & desirability, many of which have a positive impact even without PMF:
    • :prohibited:Locking RSR longer (years, instead of days) for a greater share of ecosystem upside
    • :exclamation_question_mark:Govern specific DTFs/RTokens (currently tainted with 2025s eUSD issue)
    • :white_check_mark: Platform fees burning RSR (impact depends on onchain adoption, tokenization and Reserve PMF)
    • :prohibited:Govern treasury management for earning yield and managing runway
    • :prohibited:Govern strategy/funding approvals for dev, marketing, grants, gov delegates, or side quests
    • :prohibited:Govern RSR supply emissions management, burns, etc
    • :prohibited:Govern ecosystem growth and referral incentives (destinations, amounts, etc.)
    • :prohibited:Govern protocol parameters & upgrades
  5. Recommend Reserve shift the brand messaging to 10% philosophy and 90% how, when, where, and user value. Historically it’s been closer to the opposite and the market has answered. Getting PMF in ‘26/27 won’t have much to do with the 10 or 20 year philosophy.
  6. “What we all need to do” to help, requires community scaffolding and aligned incentives.
  7. GTM shots at $2M ea is just the economic capital. How could the community be leveraged as capital to reduce CAC and increase LTV?
    • Community = Customers = Amplifiers.
    • What is Reserve’s version of Tesla or Apple or Ethereum or ClaudeAI fanboys?
  8. Nevin’s chart on DTF incentives, gross margins, and revenue to RSR holders creates a helpful lens. BFF’s 15% RSR allocation would be good to sit on a similar chart beside other channels. How is that investment performing compared to others? May the best products & channels win.
  9. “Stopping RSR emissions” might come across as a meme placeholder, like earlier social, mutable ideas around “slower wallet” or “Bitcoin-style curves.” With the market maturing and professionalizing, recommend some urgency toward transparent mechanisms, enforceable rules and metrics legibility.

Thank you to everyone who vibrantly contributed to the RSR Health discussion. Hope we will harness and utilize that energy productively. Thank you to Nevin and core team for engaging - you have the hardest job of all.

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I think the core tension here isn’t decentralization vs. centralization, it’s timing.

RSR feels frustrating because it’s not emotionally rewarding yet. The fact is, the system is still being built. Projects trying to replace monetary infrastructure can’t optimize for token sentiment first, they have to survive regulatory, institutional and real-world complexity before anything else.

Decentralization is an outcome of success, not a starting condition. This is severely overlooked.

26 rebalances actually paid less revenue to UglyCash than 12 or even 4 per year, which could have cut governance load 50–80%.

James, this is false. Stop spreading misinformation.

@Sawyer

I provided analysis and receipts 5 months ago to which you the compensated eUSD Champion still have not responded too.

If you have a counter argument supported with data, please provide. All of the math in the provided spreadsheet is inspectable so if you find an error please flag.

“Recommend Reserve shift the brand messaging to 10% philosophy and 90% how, when, where, and user value.”

James, I appreciate you flagging this—shifting toward more concrete “how, when, where, and user-value” messaging makes sense as a long-term goal, especially once we have clearer paths to PMF.

That said, I don’t believe anyone can reliably forecast where this market will be in 2026/27. The practical details (how, when, where) we’ll ultimately communicate depend on several fast-moving and still-uncertain factors…

- Regulatory frameworks that are only now taking shape, with outcomes still far from certainty

- Core infrastructure (custody, compliance, distribution, onboarding rails) that remains under construction—much of which we are actively building

- Adoption curves that have repeatedly defied prediction in crypto

Reserve sits at the intersection of stablecoin infrastructure and crypto indexes in an industry with extremely low retail penetration. Collateral in our DTFs is volatile, the culture remains tribal (indexes don’t yet carry the same intuitive appeal as ETFs), and even basic assets like ETH trigger panic-selling at modest drawdowns. Regulatory clarity is better than before, but still limited, and the addressable market for non-custodial, self-custodial products is small.

In this environment, an expansive vision doesn’t yet map neatly onto today’s constrained reality. That’s precisely why our core philosophy is essential right now: it provides the steady north star that sustains disciplined building through uncertainty while the market gradually matures and catches up.

Great products and mature governance will come—in fact, they’re already emerging—and we will evolve with them. We have always been ready to scale responsibly as conditions allow, without deviating from that north star.

I’d be happy to discuss more goal orientated approaches with you, with a bit less ‘Furthermore’. Let things sit with you a bit longer Brother, no need for such sarcasm, respectfully.

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James, this is false. My responses are in the thread and one being here. Ham’s response and data are here.

James if you don’t understand why Ugly Cash’s Rev Share at 5%(1 rebalance/month) yields less than Ugly Cash’s Rev Share at 7.5%(2 rebalance/month, one at 5% and one at 10%) then I do not have time to explain this to you.

Additionally, you are perpetuating your opinions as facts. I would like to point out that these are merely opinions and may not have much factual truth to them. “Govern specific DTFs/RTokens (currently tainted with 2025s eUSD issue)”

You seem to still have an issue with how eUSD is being governed. I would like to point you to Ralph’s post which highlights that eUSD is being governed efficiently. Here is a quick quote: ”Participation is not a meaningful goal…In my - probably radical - opinion voting participation is not a meaningful goal in itself.” Ralph, who is the ecosystem governance facilitator is stating this as an opinion, as it is your opinion that there are issues with eUSD, not a fact. Is eUSD governance perfect? No! But does it work? For the time being, I think it does.

There is no evidence of Governance fatigue, you seem to have convinced a few select community members that this is the case, however there is no evidence of this being true. If this were to be true then the majority of the RevShare updates would not pass, signaling exhaustion.

The Reserve Yield Protocol is Credibly decentralized. This is a Fact, not an opinion. I am not paid by Reserve, StakeDAO is not paid by Reserve, we are two independent contributors to the eUSD DAO. Anyone can contribute! I have aligned myself with wanting the largest eUSD Market Cap. The way I see eUSD achieving the highest Market Cap is through the FinTechs and providing unwavering support to them. It is unfortunate that in recent events surrounding PMF that it looks like all of eUSD throughout DeFi will inevitably wind down. This is my opinion on what might happen due to how expensive it is to provide incentives. I foresee a scenario where there is just enough eUSD DEX liquidity for the protocol to reliably operate and nothing more. Additionally, ABC Labs will stop incentives in a few weeks on the eUSD Morpho Vaults, this will lead to stRSR percentage going down drastically. The market does not care about overcollateralization and therefore the market does not care about the RSR staker. My own opinion is that we might run into a scenario where only 1% is going to stRSR as a small layer of protection during governance led rebalances. I will repeat myself, the market does not care about overcollateralization. I have aligned myself with the success of the FinTechs first, RSR staker second.

You brought up my compensation, last year(2025) I made about $25k(unaudited) from eUSD. This year(2026) I am on track to make probably about the same. Here is my address for those that are interested. Reserve does not Pay me this comes from earning 3% of the overall piece of the pie for eUSD. Ralph has actually stated how underpaid I am for the work that I do.

My suggestions:

  • Stop perpetuating your opinions as facts!
  • Lead by example, are there any tangible action items that you have completed that can be shared. It seems like your contributions are just suggestions on how you think things can be improved. There is no action!
  • Rally the community around Reserve’s mission for 2026, while we can point at the RSR price, Reserve has stated that they are focused on finding pmf on the index protocol. If everyone is aligned here and we find success, then we win. As Nevin said it bluntly, something along the lines of we are all in this to make money. WAGBI!
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Hi Tom! Thanks for referencing my post here. I wanted to provide full context on this, so this doesn’t get clipped.

Participation in democractic systems is of course good. In Strnad’s seminal paper, which I linked to in the original post. he goes into detail about how and when it isn’t. I also provide an example of two fictional DAOs with different participation rates, to illustrate the point.

The culprit here is not eUSD, or Reserve, but a wider misunderstanding of what token-weighted voting on arbitrary proposals is and what it can do.

Token-weighted voting is - maybe surprisingly - not democractic at all. It is about as democratic as if every citizen of the US could vote with as much voting power as their net worth in USD.

Much of the research on social choice theory is on one person one vote, and not one token one vote, and isn’t applicable here.

Thanks again for quoting me. Very grateful that I can make a difference.
We had discussed the topic a couple of times during the DTF governance weekly’s on X, that you helped “co-found” and get off the ground.

In my opinion stakers are always going to doubt what they pay for, if they get no receipts.
We had Ugly Cash and Sentz come on the forum and share what they have done, which assuages much of the concerns around the FinTech Rev Share.

I know you write detailed reports once a quarter, but maybe it would be good to just take stock of your contributions and publish an overview of your efforts towards eUSD. I think this would quickly dispell any lingering dissatisfaction.

Hope this is useful, Raphael

@Sawyer ,
Glad you are motivated for Reserve’s 2026 PMF goals.

Consider if your time and the community’s resources had been focused 6–12 months ago on PMF, instead of burned on rev-share governance for eUSD, whose TVL is unchanged.

Difficult to understand why you are stuck on bi-weekly rev share changes unless you’ve been privately directed to do so for some reason.

I’ve reread your responses, and the issue is glaring. Your analysis only looks at a rolling 14-day window, even though eUSD TVL performance is flat year over year. Meanwhile, shifting shares between Ugly Cash, Sentz, and RSR stakers introduce ongoing shaving inefficiencies.

I’ve provided here analysis on 365 days of eUSD’s data (26x more, no pun intended). As I outlined in Sept 2025, the method for your calculations (bi weekly period ending) ranks 4th amongst seven options.

Here is the summary table you can find in AA:4 of the mentioned and linked spreadsheet.

The pennies difference in methods is actually immaterial. It would be easy to get about the same result for eUSD and RSR with 50 to 80% less work.

Sadly, this centralization display and distracting waste of time has been costly to the Reserve and eUSD brands, stakers and RSR.

If you and the Reserve community want more precision, there are three stronger options for calculating rev share.

If you and the Reserve community want more resources focused on DTF product market fit, then its an easy decision.

Imagine this gets sorted eventually. Final cost tbd.

I’ve moved on to other things.

.

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I’m not entirely sure if this is the best place to post this,
but I wanted to share it here for context, as it seems related to the 01-15-26 Community Call recap + discussion.

from what’s been discussed recently in DC, it seems that one of the key regulatory concerns around stablecoins is whether issuer-paid yield effectively turns them into securities or bank-like products.

In that context, Reserve’s long-standing approach — keeping stablecoins as a neutral monetary layer while routing potential returns through DTFs and DeFi-based, risk-bearing mechanisms rather than guaranteed yield — appears quite deliberate and regulation-aware.

Structures like DTFs, and even protocols such as UglyCash, where returns are clearly the outcome of on-chain strategies rather than promised interest, seem especially relevant in light of these discussions.

I’m curious whether, following your recent DC conversations, this architectural separation still reflects your core thinking for Reserve, or if you see any need to evolve the strategy going forward.

On a separate note, could you also share a brief update on the previously mentioned 30B RSR burn plan, and whether it remains an active part of the roadmap?

“Sadly, this centralization display and distracting waste of time has been costly to the Reserve and eUSD brands, stakers and RSR.”

Agree with James here. If the revenue share can’t be programmed to adjust per block, then we have to be realistic and make considerations for human-driven governance. Biweekly vs monthly or quarterly debate when the chart is literally flat is missing the point big time. It’s an ecosystem and Ugly Cash and Sentz will be ok if they miss a few pennies here and there. RSR stakers are giving up a lot to Ugly Cash and it’s ok if the agreement is not perfectly upheld. After all, perfect is block-based and biweekly is too frequent for humans.

It’s ok to capitulate and change the system, Sawyer. Just change it to something reasonable and move on.

If Ugly Cash and Sentz have a problem with less frequent updates than quarterly, then they could pony up the resources to develop the code that updates the revenue share per block and eliminates this governance theater.