1.) Regarding the burn: I was initially against a burn, but I’ve changed my opinion after giving it more thought. It is likely true that a burn won’t affect the price much (if at all), but I do think it’s more about sending a signal. We are not where we all had hoped we would be in terms of PMF and adoption of the protocol, and we see many once very loyal community members leaving or losing hope. Extraordinary circumstances require extraordinary responses, and I would say we’ve arrived at such a point. Burning RSR would be such a response.
2.) Unlocking RSR: One of the community’s main concerns is the supply (both circulating and total). While I personally trust ABC Labs to not dump their RSR in an irresponsible way, I also understand that trust should not be required in a space that offers “trustless” infrastructure. The slow and slower wallets alone hold around 35% of the total supply and could, at least in theory, be unlocked at any given time by the team (I think the slow wallet has a relatively short unlock period of 4 weeks). Moving this RSR to contracts that verifiably prevent any dump would address these concerns. It was obviously planned to do that by implementing the Bitcoin emissions approach in the form of a contract, but I think we would need to go even further. Which brings me to my next point.
3.) Governance: So if a considerable amount of RSR were to be locked, how would ABC Labs and others be funded? It would require a governance system that is used to allocate said funds. I really like Nevin’s idea of using a milestone-based approach, but letting RSR holders vote based on their amount of tokens bears the risk of whales manipulating outcomes—and ABC Labs is one of the largest holders of RSR. So that might be a good point to think about a lightweight version of the veRSR governance approach that I’ve proposed in this RFC, where long-term commitment is rewarded with increased voting power (more veRSR). RSR holders would have to vote-lock their RSR in exchange for veRSR; the longer the timeframe, the more voting power they would get. One would have to choose between short-term liquidity (no vote-locking or only over a short timeframe) and more veRSR, where veRSR could boost your rewards by redirecting some of the protocol’s fees towards veRSR holders or, later, DTFs, liquidity pools, and others. But I think a simplified version of this—without any integration into DTFs—could be a good starting point.